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Security Council
Sixty-ninth year

Protracted conflicts in the GUAM area and their implications for international peace, security and development

The situation in the occupied territories of Azerbaijan

Letter dated 10 January 2014 from the Permanent Representative of Azerbaijan to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

In accordance with instructions received from the Government of the Republic of Azerbaijan, I have the honour to draw your attention to the ongoing violations of the ceasefire by the armed forces of the Republic of Armenia recorded for November 2013 (see annex). As seen from the annexed information, during the reporting period the armed forces of Armenia continued intensive fire from their positions in the occupied territories of Azerbaijan and from the territory of Armenia.

I should be grateful if you would have the present letter and its annex circulated as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda items 34 and 38, and of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Agshin **Mehdiyev**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

14-20560 (E) 230114

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Annex to the letter dated 10 January 2014 from the Permanent Representative of Azerbaijan to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

Violation of the ceasefire by the armed forces of the Republic of Armenia* for November 2013

No.	*Date*	*Time*	*Direction (locality)*	*Weapons used*	*Casualties and damages*
1	1 November	0005-0015	Kuropatkino village (Khojavand district, Azerbaijan)	AK assault rifle	–
2		0105-0115	Kuropatkino village (Khojavand district, Azerbaijan)	AKM assault rifle	–
3		0120-0125	Merzili and Giyamaddinli villages (Aghdam district, Azerbaijan)	AK assault rifle	–
4		0230-0245	Kuropatkino village (Khojavand district, Azerbaijan)	AKM assault rifle	–
5		0300-0310	Shykhlar and Bash Garvand villages (Aghdam district, Azerbaijan)	AK assault rifle	–
6		1520-1550	Jil village (Krasnoselskiy district, Armenia) and Galakend village (Gedabey district, Azerbaijan)	DShK heavy machine gun	–
7		1840-1845	Garakhanbeyli and Alykhanly villages (Fizuli district, Azerbaijan)	AK assault rifle	–
8		1955-2025	Gulustan village (Goranboy district, Azerbaijan)	DShK heavy machine gun	–
9		2220-2230	Talysh and Tapgaragoyunlu villages (Goranboy district, Azerbaijan)	AK assault rifle	–
10	2 November	0125-0135	Shykhlar and Bash Garvand villages (Aghdam district, Azerbaijan)	AK assault rifle	–
11		0235-0245	Barekamavan village (Noyemberyan district, Armenia) and Gaymagly village (Gazakh district, Azerbaijan)	AKM assault rifle	–
12		1035-1040	Merzili and Giyamaddinli villages (Aghdam district, Azerbaijan)	AK assault rifle	–
13		1045-1050	Merzili and Giyamaddinli villages (Aghdam district, Azerbaijan)	AK assault rifle	–
14		1530-1545	Gulustan village (Goranboy district, Azerbaijan)	AK assault rifle	–

No	Date	Time	Direction (locality)	Weapons used	Casualties and damages
15		1820-1840	Namirli village (Tartar district, Azerbaijan)	AK assault rifle	–
16		1845-1850	Ashaghy Veyselli village (Fizuli district, Azerbaijan)	AK assault rifle	–
17		2230-2240	Kuropatkino village (Khojavand district, Azerbaijan)	AK assault rifle	–
18		2345-0005	Javahirli and Garadaghly villages (Aghdam district, Azerbaijan)	AKM assault rifle	–
19	3 November	0115-0125	Garagashly village (Aghdam district, Azerbaijan)	AK assault rifle	–
20		0145-0150	Berkaber village (Ijevan district, Armenia) and Gyzylhajyly village (Gazakh district, Azerbaijan)	AK assault rifle	–
21		1505-1510	Ashaghy Veyselli village (Fizuli district, Azerbaijan)	AK assault rifle	–
22		1515-1520	Ashaghy Veyselli village (Fizuli district, Azerbaijan)	AK assault rifle	–
23		2040-2050	Talysh and Tapgaragoyunlu villages (Goranboy district, Azerbaijan)	AK assault rifle	–
24		2045-2055	Talysh and Tapgaragoyunlu villages (Goranboy district, Azerbaijan)	AK assault rifle	–
25		2100-2130	Mosesgekh and Aygepar villages (Berd district, Armenia) and Alibeyli village (Tovuz district, Azerbaijan)	AK assault rifle	–
26	4 November	0530-0545	Gorgan and Ashaghy Abdurrahmanly villages (Fizuli district, Azerbaijan)	AK assault rifle	–
27		0530-0545	Garakhanbeyli and Alykhanly villages (Fizuli district, Azerbaijan)	AK assault rifle	–
28		0530-0545	Horadiz and Ashaghy Abdurrahmanly villages (Fizuli district, Azerbaijan)	AK assault rifle	–
29		1030-1035	Yusifjanly village (Aghdam district, Azerbaijan)	AK assault rifle	–
30		1045-1050	Merzili and Giyamaddinli villages (Aghdam district, Azerbaijan)	AK assault rifle	–
31		1655-1658	Kuropatkino village (Khojavand district, Azerbaijan)	AK and AKM assault rifles	–

No.	*Date*	*Time*	*Direction (locality)*	*Weapons used*	*Casualties and damages*
32		2300-2325	Yusifjanly village (Aghdam district, Azerbaijan)	AK assault rifle	–
33		2310-2325	Gulustan village (Goranboy district, Azerbaijan)	AK assault rifle	–
34	5 November	0530-0535	Garakhanbeyli and Alykhanly villages (Fizuli district, Azerbaijan)	AK assault rifle	–
35		1300-1310	Talysh and Tapgaragoyunlu villages (Goranboy district, Azerbaijan)	AK assault rifle	–
36		1430-1435	Garakhanbeyli and Alykhanly villages (Fizuli district, Azerbaijan)	AK assault rifle	–
37		2045-2100	Jerabert and Karmiravan villages (Tartar district, Azerbaijan)	AK and AKM assault rifles	–
38		2050-2110	Jerabert and Karmiravan villages (Tartar district, Azerbaijan)	AKM assault rifle	–
39		2150-2200	Kuropatkino village (Khojavand district, Azerbaijan)	AK assault rifle	–
40		2150-2200	Talysh and Tapgaragoyunlu villages (Goranboy district, Azerbaijan)	AK assault rifle	–
41		2200-2210	Talysh and Tapgaragoyunlu villages (Goranboy district, Azerbaijan)	AK assault rifle	–
42		2315-2320	Voskepar village (Noyemberyan district, Armenia) and Ashaghy Eskipara village (Gazakh district, Azerbaijan)	AK assault rifle	–
43	6 November	0105-0115	Garakhanbeyli and Alykhanly villages (Fizuli district, Azerbaijan)	AK assault rifle	–
44		0105-0115	Ashaghy Seyidahmedli and Alykhanly villages (Fizuli district, Azerbaijan)	AK assault rifle	–
45		0120-0130	Garakhanbeyli and Alykhanly villages (Fizuli district, Azerbaijan)	AK assault rifle	–
46		1315-1325	Kuropatkino village (Khojavand district, Azerbaijan)	AK assault rifle	–
47		1510-1540	Talysh and Tapgaragoyunlu villages (Goranboy district, Azerbaijan)	AK assault rifle	–
48		1650-1655	Ashaghy Veyselli village (Fizuli district, Azerbaijan)	AKM assault rifle	–

No.	Date	Time	Direction (locality)	Weapons used	Casualties and damages
49		2240-2310	Talysh and Tapgaragoyunlu villages (Goranboy district, Azerbaijan)	AK assault rifle	–
50		2340-2345	Garakhanbeyli and Alykhanly villages (Fizuli district, Azerbaijan)	AK assault rifle	–
51	7 November	0025-0045	Berkaber village (Ijevan district, Armenia) and Gyzylhajyly village (Gazakh district, Azerbaijan)	AKM assault rifle	–
52		0410-0420	Gorgan and Ashaghy Abdurrahmanly villages (Fizuli district, Azerbaijan)	AK assault rifle	–
53		0415-0425	Gorgan and Ashaghy Abdurrahmanly villages (Fizuli district, Azerbaijan)	AK assault rifle	–
54		1750-1800	Garakhanbeyli and Alykhanly villages (Fizuli district, Azerbaijan)	AK assault rifle	–
55	8 November	0455-0510	Merzili and Giyamaddinli villages (Aghdam district, Azerbaijan)	AK assault rifle	–
56		1820-1845	Kurdeliler village (Goygol district, Azerbaijan)	AKM assault rifle	–
57	9 November	0840-0845	Garakhanbeyli and Alykhanly villages (Fizuli district, Azerbaijan)	AK assault rifle	–
58		0855-0900	Gorgan and Ashaghy Abdurrahmanly villages (Fizuli district, Azerbaijan)	AK assault rifle	–
59		0900-0905	Garakhanbeyli and Alykhanly villages (Fizuli district, Azerbaijan)	AK assault rifle	–
60		1250-1300	Talysh village (Goranboy district, Azerbaijan) and Chayly village (Tartar district, Azerbaijan)	AK assault rifle	–
61	10 November	0440-0454	Gorgan and Ashaghy Abdurrahmanly villages (Fizuli district, Azerbaijan)	AK assault rifle	–
62		0445-0450	Garakhanbeyli and Alykhanly villages (Fizuli district, Azerbaijan)	AK assault rifle	–
63		0530-0535	Kuropatkino village (Khojavand district, Azerbaijan)	AKM assault rifle	–
64		0535-0540	Kuropatkino village (Khojavand district, Azerbaijan)	AK assault rifle	–

No	Date	Time	Direction (locality)	Weapons used	Casualties and damages
65		1800-1815	Berkaber village (Ijevan district, Armenia) and Gyzylhajyly village (Gazakh district, Azerbaijan)	AKM assault rifle	–
66		1820-1825	Voskepar village (Noyemberyan district, Armenia) and Ashaghy Eskipara village (Gazakh district, Azerbaijan)	SVD sniper rifle	–
67		2200-2210	Kuropatkino village (Khojavand district, Azerbaijan)	AKM assault rifle	–
68		2335-2340	Kuropatkino village (Khojavand district, Azerbaijan)	AKM assault rifle	–
69	11 November	0115-0120	Garakhanbeyli and Alykhanly villages (Fizuli district, Azerbaijan)	AK assault rifle	–
70		1530-1550	Namirli village (Tartar district, Azerbaijan)	AKM assault rifle	–
71		2350-2355	Shuraabad and Tezekend villages (Aghdam district, Azerbaijan)	AK assault rifle	–
72	12 November	0010-0030	Voskepar village (Noyemberyan district, Armenia)	AK assault rifle and SVD sniper rifle	–
73		0015-0035	Berkaber village (Ijevan district, Armenia) and Gyzylhajyly village (Gazakh district, Azerbaijan)	AK assault rifle	–
74		0430-0435	Horadiz and Ashaghy Abdurrahmanly villages (Fizuli district, Azerbaijan)	AK assault rifle	–
75		0440-0445	Garakhanbeyli and Alykhanly villages (Fizuli district, Azerbaijan)	AK assault rifle	–
76		0450-0505	Garakhanbeyli and Alykhanly villages (Fizuli district, Azerbaijan)	AK assault rifle	–
77		0505-0510	Kuropatkino village (Khojavand district, Azerbaijan)	AK assault rifle	–
78		0520-0525	Kuropatkino village (Khojavand district, Azerbaijan)	AK assault rifle	–
79		1210-1220	Yusifjanly and Giyamaddinli villages (Aghdam district, Azerbaijan)	SVD sniper rifle	–
80		1550-1600	Saryjaly and Garadaghly villages (Aghdam district, Azerbaijan)	AK assault rifle	–
81		1640-1645	Talysh and Tapgaragoyunlu villages (Goranboy district, Azerbaijan)	AK and AKM assault rifles	–

No	*Date*	*Time*	*Direction (locality)*	*Weapons used*	*Casualties and damages*
82		2105-2115	Yusifjanly and Giyamaddinli villages (Aghdam district, Azerbaijan)	AK assault rifle	–
83		2125-2150	Levonarkh village (Tartar district, Azerbaijan)	AKM assault rifle	–
84		2345-2355	Kuropatkino village (Khojavand district, Azerbaijan)	AKM assault rifle	–
85	13 November	0045-0055	Horadiz and Ashaghy Abdurrahmanly villages (Fizuli district, Azerbaijan)	AKM assault rifle	–
86		0135-0150	Garakhanbeyli and Alykhanly villages (Fizuli district, Azerbaijan)	AK assault rifle	–
87		0205-0210	Kuropatkino village (Khojavand district, Azerbaijan)	SVD sniper rifle	–
88		0245-0300	Talysh and Tapgaragoyunlu villages (Goranboy district, Azerbaijan)	AK and AKM assault rifles	–
89		0255-0300	Talysh and Tapgaragoyunlu villages (Goranboy district, Azerbaijan)	AK assault rifle	–
90		0340-0345	Voskepar village (Noyemberyan district, Armenia) and Ashaghy Eskipara village (Gazakh district, Azerbaijan)	AK assault rifle	–
91		0520-0525	Garakhanbeyli and Alykhanly villages (Fizuli district, Azerbaijan)	AK and AKM assault rifles	–
92		0520-0525	Ashaghy Seyidahmedli and Alykhanly villages (Fizuli district, Azerbaijan)	AK assault rifle	–
93		1030-1050	Saryjaly and Garadaghly villages (Aghdam district, Azerbaijan)	AK assault rifle	–
94		1120-1130	Novruzlu village (Aghdam district, Azerbaijan)	AK assault rifle	–
95		1450-1510	Talysh and Tapgaragoyunlu villages (Goranboy district, Azerbaijan)	AKM assault rifle	–
96		2200-2215	Chinari village (Berd district, Armenia) and Kokhanabi village (Tovuz district, Azerbaijan)	AK assault rifle	–
97		2230-2235	Ashaghy Veyselli village (Fizuli district, Azerbaijan)	SVD sniper rifle	–
98	14 November	0455-0510	Kuropatkino village (Khojavand district, Azerbaijan)	AK assault rifle	–

No.	Date	Time	Direction (locality)	Weapons used	Casualties and damages
99		1150-1215	Jil village (Krasnoselskiy district, Armenia) and Galakend village (Gedabey district, Azerbaijan)	AKM assault rifle	–
100		1155-1220	Jil village (Krasnoselskiy district, Armenia) and Galakend village (Gedabey district, Azerbaijan)	AKM assault rifle	–
101		1350-1400	Talysh and Tapgaragoyunlu villages (Goranboy district, Azerbaijan)	AK assault rifle	–
102		1615-1620	Merzili and Giyamaddinli villages (Aghdam district, Azerbaijan)	SVD sniper rifle	–
103	15 November	0200-0210	Kuropatkino village (Khojavand district, Azerbaijan)	AK assault rifle	–
104		0200-0210	Shykhlar and Bash Garvand villages (Aghdam district, Azerbaijan)	AK assault rifle	–
105		0215-0220	Horadiz and Ashaghy Abdurrahmanly villages (Fizuli district, Azerbaijan)	AK assault rifle	–
106		0220-0230	Merzili and Giyamaddinli villages (Aghdam district, Azerbaijan)	AK assault rifle	–
107		1415-1425	Orjenekidze village (Krasnoselskiy district, Armenia) and Garaveller village (Gedabey district, Azerbaijan)	AK assault rifle	–
108		0435-0440	Garakhanbeyli and Alykhanly villages (Fizuli district, Azerbaijan)	AK assault rifle	–
109		0450-0455	Kuropatkino village (Khojavand district, Azerbaijan)	AKM assault rifle	–
110		0855-0910	Gulustan village (Goranboy district, Azerbaijan)	AKM assault rifle and DshK heavy machine gun	–
111		1250-1255	Ashaghy Veyselli village (Fizuli district, Azerbaijan)	AK assault rifle	–
112	16 November	0240-0245	Kuropatkino village (Khojavand district, Azerbaijan)	AK assault rifle	–
113		0245-0300	Garakhanbeyli and Alykhanly villages (Fizuli district, Azerbaijan)	AK assault rifle	–
114		0255-0315	Garakhanbeyli and Alykhanly villages (Fizuli district, Azerbaijan)	AK assault rifle	–

No.	*Date*	*Time*	*Direction (locality)*	*Weapons used*	*Casualties and damages*
115		0320-0330	Garakhanbeyli and Alykhanly villages (Fizuli district, Azerbaijan)	AK assault rifle	–
116		0325-0330	Berkaber village (Ijevan district, Armenia) and Gyzylhajyly village (Gazakh district, Azerbaijan)	AK assault rifle	–
117		1255-1300	Ashaghy Veyselli village (Fizuli district, Azerbaijan)	AK assault rifle	–
118		2000-2005	Yusifjanly and Giyamaddinli villages (Aghdam district, Azerbaijan)	SVD sniper rifle	–
119		2205-2230	Yarymja village (Tartar district, Azerbaijan)	AKM assault rifle	–
120	17 November	0005-0020	Jerabert and Karmiravan villages (Tartar district, Azerbaijan)	AKM assault rifle	–
121		0120-0125	Gorgan and Ashaghy Abdurrahmanly villages (Fizuli district, Azerbaijan)	AK assault rifle	–
122		0130-0135	Kuropatkino village (Khojavand district, Azerbaijan)	AK assault rifle	–
123		0210-0230	Berkaber village (Ijevan district, Armenia) and Gyzylhajyly village (Gazakh district, Azerbaijan)	AKM assault rifle	–
124		0210-0215	Garakhanbeyli and Alykhanly villages (Fizuli district, Azerbaijan)	AK assault rifle	–
125		0220-0225	Ashaghy Seyidahmedli and Alykhanly villages (Fizuli district, Azerbaijan)	AK assault rifle	–
126		0230-0235	Horadiz and Ashaghy Abdurrahmanly villages (Fizuli district, Azerbaijan)	AK assault rifle	–
127		0830-0900	Gulustan village (Goranboy district, Azerbaijan)	AK assault rifle	–
128		2130-2140	Talysh and Tapgaragoyunlu villages (Goranboy district, Azerbaijan)	AK assault rifle	–
129	18 November	0110-0120	Voskepar village (Noyemberyan district, Armenia)	SVD sniper rifle	–
130		0315-0325	Jerabert and Karmiravan villages (Tartar district, Azerbaijan)	AK assault rifle	–
131		0430-0435	Voskepar village (Noyemberyan district, Armenia) and Ashaghy Eskipara village (Gazakh district, Azerbaijan)	AK assault rifle	–

No.	*Date*	*Time*	*Direction (locality)*	*Weapons used*	*Casualties and damages*
132		0500-0510	Voskevan village (Noyemberyan district, Armenia) and Gushchu Ayrum village (Gazakh district, Azerbaijan)	AK assault rifle	–
133		0520-0525	Kuropatkino village (Khojavand district, Azerbaijan)	AK assault rifle	–
134		0530-0535	Kuropatkino village (Khojavand district, Azerbaijan)	AK assault rifle	–
135		0730-0740	Voskepar village (Noyemberyan district, Armenia)	AK assault rifle	–
136		2220-2225	Kuropatkino village (Khojavand district, Azerbaijan)	AK assault rifle	–
137	19 November	0100-0110	Garakhanbeyli and Alykhanly villages (Fizuli district, Azerbaijan)	AK assault rifle	–
138		0120-0130	Shykhlar and Bash Garvand villages (Aghdam district, Azerbaijan)	AKM assault rifle	–
139		1435-1445	Kurdeliler village (Goygol district, Azerbaijan)	AKM assault rifle	–
140		2200-2205	Ashaghy Veyselli village (Fizuli district, Azerbaijan)	AK assault rifle	–
141		2200-2220	Berkaber village (Ijevan district, Armenia) and Gyzylhajyly village (Gazakh district, Azerbaijan)	AKM assault rifle	–
142	20 November	0130-0135	Voskepar village (Noyemberyan district, Armenia)	AKM assault rifle	–
143		0430-0450	Gulustan village (Goranboy district, Azerbaijan)	AKM assault rifle	–
144		1650-1655	Yusifjanly and Giyamaddinli villages (Aghdam district, Azerbaijan)	SVD sniper rifle	–
145	21 November	2230-2250	Saryjaly village (Aghdam district, Azerbaijan)	AKM assault rifle	–
146	22 November	0105-0110	Garakhanbeyli and Alykhanly villages (Fizuli district, Azerbaijan)	AK assault rifle	–
147		0450-0455	Gorgan and Ashaghy Abdurrahmanly villages (Fizuli district, Azerbaijan)	AK assault rifle	–
148	23 November	0520-0525	Garakhanbeyli and Alykhanly villages (Fizuli district, Azerbaijan)	SVD sniper rifle	–

No	*Date*	*Time*	*Direction (locality)*	*Weapons used*	*Casualties and damages*
149		0830-0835	Kuropatkino village (Khojavand district, Azerbaijan)	AK assault rifle	–
150		1015-1017	Ashaghy Veyselli village (Fizuli district, Azerbaijan)	AK assault rifle	–
151		1430-1435	Jerabert and Karmiravan villages (Tartar district, Azerbaijan)	AKM assault rifle	–
152		2100-2110	Saryjaly village (Aghdam district, Azerbaijan)	AKM assault rifle	–
153	24 November	0630-0635	Ashaghy Veyselli village (Fizuli district, Azerbaijan)	SVD sniper rifle	–
154		1205-1215	Yusifjanly village (Aghdam district, Azerbaijan)	AK assault rifle	–
155		1655-1720	Gulustan village (Goranboy district, Azerbaijan)	DShK heavy machine gun	–
156		2048-2050	Aygedzor village (Berd district, Armenia) and Munjuglu village (Tovuz district, Azerbaijan)	DShK heavy machine gun	–
157		2205-2235	Yarymja village (Tartar district, Azerbaijan)	AK assault rifle	–
158	25 November	0030-0035	Garakhanbeyli and Alykhanly villages (Fizuli district, Azerbaijan)	AK assault rifle	–
159		0035-0047	Parakavar village (Ijevan district, Armenia) and Kohne Gyshlag village (Aghstafa district, Azerbaijan)	AK assault rifle	–
160		0435-0445	Talysh and Tapgaragoyunlu villages (Goranboy district, Azerbaijan)	AKM assault rifle	–
161		1240-1245	Berkaber village (Ijevan district, Armenia) and Gyzylhajyly village (Gazakh district, Azerbaijan)	AK assault rifle	–
162		1530-1535	Shuraabad village (Aghdam district, Azerbaijan)	DShK heavy machine gun	–
163		2200-2215	Chinari village (Berd district, Armenia) and Kokhanabi village (Tovuz district, Azerbaijan)	AK assault rifle	–
164		2230-2235	Ashaghy Veyselli village (Fizuli district, Azerbaijan)	AK assault rifle	–

No.	Date	Time	Direction (locality)	Weapons used	Casualties and damages
165		2310-2320	Talysh and Tapgaragoyunlu villages (Goranboy district, Azerbaijan)	SVD sniper rifle	–
166	26 November	0020-0025	Kuropatkino village (Khojavand district, Azerbaijan)	AKM assault rifle	–
167		0030-0035	Kuropatkino village (Khojavand district, Azerbaijan)	AK assault rifle	–
168		1100-1110	Talysh and Tapgaragoyunlu villages (Goranboy district, Azerbaijan)	AK assault rifle	–
169		1220-1235	Talysh and Tapgaragoyunlu villages (Goranboy district, Azerbaijan)	AK assault rifle	–
170		1230-1240	Talysh and Tapgaragoyunlu villages (Goranboy district, Azerbaijan)	AKM assault rifle	–
171	27 November	0807-0810	Kuropatkino village (Khojavand district, Azerbaijan)	AK assault rifle	–
172		0813-0817	Kuropatkino village (Khojavand district, Azerbaijan)	AKM assault rifle	–
173		0820-0825	Kuropatkino village (Khojavand district, Azerbaijan)	AK assault rifle	–
174	28 November	1220-1230	Saryjaly village (Aghdam district, Azerbaijan)	AKM assault rifle	–
175		1300-1310	Yusifjanly village (Aghdam district, Azerbaijan)	AK assault rifle	–
176		1940-1950	Voskepar village (Noyemberyan district, Armenia) and Ashaghy Eskipara village (Gazakh district, Azerbaijan)	AK assault rifle	–
177		2325-2340	Kengerli village (Aghdam district, Azerbaijan)	AK assault rifle	–
178		2320-2340	Chinari village (Berd district, Armenia) and Kokhanabi village (Tovuz district, Azerbaijan)	AK assault rifle	–
179	29 November	0225-0240	Shykhlar and Bash Garvand villages (Aghdam district, Azerbaijan)	AK assault rifle	–
180		0340-0355	Berkaber village (Ijevan district, Armenia) and Gyzylhajyly village (Gazakh district, Azerbaijan)	AK assault rifle	–

No	*Date*	*Time*	*Direction (locality)*	*Weapons used*	*Casualties and damages*
181		1740-1750	Garakhanbeyli and Alykhanly villages (Fizuli district, Azerbaijan)	AK assault rifle	–
182		1805-1815	Saryjaly and Garadaghly villages (Aghdam district, Azerbaijan)	AK assault rifle	–
183		2030-2040	Ashaghy Veyselli village (Fizuli district, Azerbaijan)	AK assault rifle	–
184		2045-2050	Kuropatkino village (Khojavand district, Azerbaijan)	AKM assault rifle	–
185		2115-2125	Kuropatkino village (Khojavand district, Azerbaijan)	AKM assault rifle	–
186	30 November	0530-0540	Kuropatkino village (Khojavand district, Azerbaijan)	AK assault rifle	–
187		0750-0805	Berkaber village (Ijevan district, Armenia) and Gyzylhajyly village (Gazakh district, Azerbaijan)	AKM and AK assault rifles	–

Abbreviations: AK/AKM Kalashnikov rifle; PK Kalashnikov machine gun; SVD sniper rifle; DShK heavy machine gun.

* Settlements of the Republic of Azerbaijan included in this information are under occupation by the Republic of Armenia or situated close to the fire point areas.

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General Assembly
Sixty-eighth session
Agenda items 53, 124 and 132

Comprehensive review of the whole question of peacekeeping operations in all their aspects

Strengthening of the United Nations system

Review of the efficiency of the administrative and financial functioning of the United Nations

Security Council
Sixty-ninth year

Civilian capacity in the aftermath of conflict

Report of the Secretary-General

Summary

Building resilient national institutions and capacities in the aftermath of conflict is critical to the consolidation of peace. The present report, the last stand-alone report on civilian capacity in the aftermath of conflict, addresses issues raised by Member States, highlights results achieved in the past two years, underlines lessons learned, and identifies remaining challenges and a way forward.

In proposing future directions, the present report emphasizes the delivery of institution-building results in the field through a more systematic and coherent response on the part of the United Nations that is strongly connected to national priorities and to other international partners. In order to provide clear accountability, this work will be incorporated within existing structures and business processes, ending the work of the stand-alone team by June 2014, but maintaining the momentum established over the past two years. Efforts will focus on three areas where there is both a demonstrated potential to deliver results and a need to consolidate and strengthen support: (a) improvement of support to institution-building grounded in national ownership; (b) broadening and deepening the pool of civilian expertise for peacebuilding; and (c) enhancing regional, South-South and triangular cooperation.

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Improvement of the impact of institution-building cannot come at the expense of the United Nations success in providing basic security and supporting political settlements through peacekeeping operations or special political missions. Those aspects are complementary: military and troop deployments and a stable political situation can provide the breathing space needed to develop national institutions, and successful institution-building consolidates gains in peace and security. We have learned the hard way that without sustainable national institutions, it will take longer for national authorities to assume their rightful role in the aftermath of conflict and crisis.

The present report comes at a time when the United Nations is supporting nationally owned institution-building in increasingly complex situations. These include supporting the recent transitions in Libya, Mali, Somalia and Yemen; consolidating progress in Afghanistan, Côte d'Ivoire, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Haiti, Iraq, Liberia and South Sudan, as well as other countries on the agenda of the Peacebuilding Commission. The need for strengthened support to institution-building will be front and centre in the coming years in those situations and others: it is therefore timely to take stock of lessons learned and launch a concerted effort to strengthen their application.

I. Importance of institution-building in the aftermath of conflict

1. My report of 11 June 2009 on peacebuilding in the immediate aftermath of conflict (A/63/881-S/2009/304) called for an analysis of how the United Nations could better support national institution-building in the aftermath of conflict. In the report on the independent review of civilian capacity in the aftermath of conflict, conducted by my Senior Advisory Group (see A/65/747-S/2011/85), a number of recommendations and challenges were put forward, including for the United Nations. Building on that vision, my report of 19 August 2011 on civilian capacities in the aftermath of conflict (A/66/311-S/2011/527) identified concrete priority actions.

2. The General Assembly, in its resolution 66/255, affirmed the fundamental principle of national ownership, stressed the importance of supporting national civilian capacity development and institution-building, encouraged the United Nations to broaden and deepen the pool of civilian expertise for peacebuilding, and requested that I draw on all relevant expertise in the development of initiatives to support national capacities and provide an update to the Assembly in 2012. In response to that update (see A/67/312-S/2012/645), intergovernmental and expert bodies of the General Assembly raised a number of issues on which they sought clarification and additional information.

3. In the report on civilian capacity in the aftermath of conflict (A/67/312-S/2012/645), it was noted that there could be no sustained recovery from conflict without nationally owned transformation of institutions that provide citizens with political representation, justice, security, and economic opportunities. The report of 8 October 2012 on peacebuilding in the aftermath of conflict (A/67/499-S/2012/746) highlighted that institutions are critical to prevent relapse into violent conflict. A considerable body of research has shown that countries with strong, accountable and inclusive institutions are 30 to 45 per cent less likely to fall into large-scale conflict.[1]

4. The General Assembly, in its resolution 67/266, the Security Council, in its resolution 2086 (2013) and Presidential Statement of 21 January 2011 (S/PRST/2011/2), and the Peacebuilding Commission have all recognized the criticality of national ownership in peacebuilding, the importance of enabling global capacities to support national institutions and the need for strengthened cooperation and coordination within the United Nations activities on peacebuilding.

5. In its resolution 66/255, the General Assembly affirmed the fundamental principle of national ownership and stressed the importance of supporting national civilian capacity development and institution-building, including through peacekeeping operations in accordance with their mandates. The efforts described in the present report respond to the requests contained in the above resolution.

6. In Afghanistan, Côte d'Ivoire, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Haiti, Iraq, Libya, Mali, Somalia, South Sudan and Yemen, Member States have mandated the United Nations to support national institutions by, for example: building national capacity to provide security and rule of law; supporting inclusive political processes; assisting national authorities with the extension of State authority in

[1] World Bank, *World Development Report 2011* (Washington, D.C.).

insecure areas; and helping to mobilize resources for national institution-building. In each of those cases, critical outcomes for peace and security are contingent on the emergence or strengthening of national institutions, and broader recovery and development will in turn be affected by successful peacebuilding and institution-building.

7. Where the United Nations presence includes a peacekeeping operation or special political mission, support to institution-building requires a partnership among Governments, missions and the agencies, funds and programmes of the United Nations, as well as regional organizations and other international and local actors. The present report summarizes efforts undertaken and lessons learned in such settings over the past two years.

8. The first section of the present report highlights the key results achieved in the past two years. The latter sections present lessons learned and plans to: (a) improve support to institution-building, grounded on national ownership; (b) broaden and deepen the pool of civilian expertise available for peacebuilding; and (c) enhance regional, South-South and triangular cooperation.

II. Results

9. The programme of work outlined in previous reports on civilian capacities in the aftermath of conflict (see A/66/311-S/2011/527 and A/67/312-S/2012/645) included piloting efforts aimed at: supporting national ownership at the country level; strengthening institutional arrangements and expertise as well as partnerships at Headquarters; and introducing measures to increase the nimbleness of the supporting systems to deploy civilian capacities. There has been progress on many fronts, including in the field, through better institutional arrangements for internal coherence and through policy frameworks and tools that enable the provision of more effective support to institution-building.

10. Credit for building national institutions rests with the countries and their people, who have successfully overcome the legacy of conflict. The United Nations has provided support to a number of countries over the past two years, including Côte d'Ivoire, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Somalia and Timor-Leste, which have seen significant improvements in the performance of national institutions. United Nations support has played an influential role in some sectors, including in police, justice and corrections, local and central government, electoral and parliamentary institutions, and support to civil society.

11. In order to improve United Nations support, previous reports on civilian capacities laid out actions to strengthen institutional arrangements and expertise across the five core gap areas (inclusive political processes, basic safety and security, justice, core government functionality, and economic revitalization). Progress has been particularly strong in the police, justice and corrections areas (see box 1), and significant actions are under way in the areas of inclusive political processes and core government functionality. Less has been achieved in the area of economic revitalization. The latter will be taken forward through future partnership work, as described in section V of the present report.

Box 1
Strengthened institutional arrangements in core peacebuilding areas

The most significant area of progress has been the designation of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) as the global focal point for police, justice and corrections areas in the rule of law in post-conflict and other crisis situations. The global focal point has demonstrated its ability to strengthen and combine the work of missions with the longer-term efforts of United Nations country teams in the area of rule of law. Specifically, the Department of Peacekeeping Operations and UNDP, through the global focal point arrangement, have delivered:

- 12 joint field visits, which resulted in joint planning and partnerships, and the provision of advice on programme structures and funding streams in Côte d'Ivoire, Guinea-Bissau, Haiti, Liberia, Libya, Sierra Leone, Somalia and South Sudan
- Joint country support plans for Côte d'Ivoire, Haiti and Libya
- Joint planning processes for United Nations support in the Central African Republic, Mali and Somalia
- Deployments of specialized expertise to Côte d'Ivoire and Libya, with support from the UNDP Experts Roster for Rapid Response
- Co-location of UNDP, the Department of Peacekeeping Operations and the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) at United Nations Headquarters in New York, coupled with seconded expertise provided by the United Nations Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women (UN-Women) to ensure gender mainstreaming in the work of the global focal point
- Joint development of a resource note on sector planning for police, justice and corrections in post-crisis and transition situations

In addition to the global focal point, the United Nations has strengthened internal cooperation in the areas of provision of constitutional assistance and support to inclusive political processes. At the country level, United Nations presences have been active in providing technical support to governments and civil society. To support those efforts, the Department of Political Affairs and UNDP have undertaken joint assessment missions to Libya, Sierra Leone and Somalia, and have worked closely with the Department of Peacekeeping Operations in Liberia and elsewhere. An internal coordination structure — bringing together the Department of Political Affairs, the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, OHCHR, the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), UNDP and UN-Women — meets regularly to coordinate efforts and is undertaking a number of joint initiatives to improve country support and share knowledge and lessons learned.

In order to improve delivery and partnerships in the area of core government functionality, I endorsed the review of lessons learned in

United Nations support to core government functions in the immediate aftermath of conflict and called on UNDP to support the implementation of its recommendations. The United Nations Working Group on Public Administration is transitioning into a robust internal coordination structure, and is led by UNDP and includes, among others, the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, the Peacebuilding Support Office, the United Nations Capital Development Fund, UNICEF and UN-Women. This structure has developed a new partnership supported by the United Nations-World Bank Partnership Trust Fund to enable joint work between the United Nations and the World Bank in a number of countries seeking assistance to rebuild the centre of government, local government, public financial management, aid management and civil service capacities in the aftermath of conflict. Work is also continuing on improving integration between missions and United Nations country teams in key areas, including the support to the extension of State authority.

12. Policy measures to improve United Nations support to institution-building include:

(a) Strengthening support for capacity development through the *United Nations Guidance Note for Effective Use and Development of National Capacity in Post-Conflict Contexts*. The guidelines assist missions and United Nations country teams in supporting national capacity development and respecting national ownership in the aftermath of conflict. They were used as substantive input into the Somali Compact; they are also being used in Liberia to strengthen programming;

(b) The revised Policy on Integrated Assessment and Planning defined national ownership as an essential condition for the sustainability of peace and requested that integrated assessment and planning processes should specify how the United Nations will support the implementation of national priorities developed on the basis of a broad-based consensus.

13. To broaden and deepen the supply of expertise, outreach efforts through the CAPMATCH platform engaged over 50 entities from Member States, of which more than two thirds are from the global South. Lessons learned from this work are discussed in further detail in section IV below. The outreach resulted in the following deployments in critical areas of institution-building needs: (a) legislative drafting expertise from Sierra Leone to the United Nations Mission in South Sudan; (b) specialized police capacities from Rwanda to the United Nations Mission in Liberia, supporting the national police in strengthening their human resources, financial, facilities and fleet management capacities; (c) specialized training support to the Liberian revenue authority at the request of the Government of Liberia, using expertise from Sierra Leone and Sweden; (d) Liberian and Senegalese expertise to the United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire, assisting the government in shaping its security sector reform, with support from the Peacebuilding Fund; (e) facilitation expertise from Iraq to support the National Dialogue Conference in Yemen, with the support of the Folke Bernadotte Academy in Sweden; and (f) 19 nominations by Croatia, Egypt and Turkey of Government-provided personnel for highly specialized institution-building expertise in justice and corrections, in support of existing

outreach efforts of the Office of Rule of Law and Security Institutions of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations.

14. As outlined in prior reports on civilian capacities, the success of effective outreach is dependent on nimble processes that facilitate the deployment of expertise. To enhance access to specialized expertise from Member States, draft guidelines on the utilization of Government-provided personnel have been developed. To facilitate a more global view of personnel requirements, budget presentation has been changed to present Government-provided personnel in the civilian personnel expenditure grouping. Senior leaders and staff have been advised on how to manage resources in response to evolving national requirements.

15. To draw on the strengths of the presence of the United Nations as a whole, guidance on how to consider the issue of comparative advantage for carrying out mandated tasks was provided as part of the revision of the policy on integrated assessment and planning, and strengthened arrangements were put in place for the transition of the United Nations Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste. Progress was also made in facilitating the flow of voluntary resources by overcoming impediments to funding from the Peacebuilding Fund through missions in support of peacebuilding and institution-building activities, in conjunction with United Nations country teams.

16. In broader partnerships to support national institution-building after conflict, three areas of work have produced good results as summarized below. Lessons learned and further work in these areas are summarized in section V below:

(a) In South-South and triangular cooperation, the civilian capacities initiative supported exchanges in Côte d'Ivoire, Liberia and Somalia and documented the complementary strengths of Southern providers and donors from the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD);

(b) With the international financial institutions, the Chairs of the United Nations Development Group, the civilian capacities steering committee and two World Bank Vice-Presidents have issued a menu of options which outlines 15 different practical opportunities for collaboration between the United Nations and the World Bank in conflict-affected countries;

(c) With regard to cooperation with regional organizations, collaboration with the League of Arab States has resulted in a joint action plan which is in early implementation; and the United Nations system has engaged with the African Union to support the African Solidarity Initiative.

17. All those efforts will be judged by their application in the field. A compelling example of what can be achieved when the United Nations works to apply new approaches in a concerted manner is set out in box 2.

Box 2

A more robust approach to institution-building — Somalia

During the planning of the United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia, the technical assessment and preparation of the first budget paid close attention to national institution-building. This resulted in a mission design that is strongly based on partnership and is responsive to the situation in-country.

Drawing on experience from other countries, an options paper was discussed with the Government to identify approaches to maximize government visibility and national ownership in programming. Those options were used by the Government in the New Deal Compact for Somalia, as endorsed in Brussels in September 2013, and in the national strategy for local governance.

Through the global focal point mechanism, the Department of Peacekeeping Operations and UNDP conducted joint field assessments and identified areas for joint activities between the mission and the United Nations country team. This led to the establishment of co-located teams in Somalia and holistic programmes to support the Government of Somalia across the areas of police, justice and corrections. Furthermore, joint activities and workplans between the United Nations country team and the mission are being explored for disarmament, demobilization and reintegration, security sector reform and constitutional processes.

The provision of support on approaches to capacity-building and institution-building, including the use of the *United Nations Guidance Note for Effective Use and Development of National Capacity in Post-Conflict Contexts*, has led to an approach that is endorsed by all partners in the New Deal Compact. This included recognition of the need for early and dedicated support to core government functions, including the centre of government, the civil service and public sector capacities, through a two-pronged approach, that consisted of (i) capacity injection to meet immediate and emerging needs; and (ii) support to the coordinated development and roll-out of basic cross-cutting administrative systems.

Technical advice was also provided — using examples from other countries — on how to structure a financing architecture that responds to the stated requirements of the Government of Somalia.

The partnership with the African Union and the African Union Mission in Somalia has been crucial in realizing gains. The United Nations and the World Bank have also cooperated well across those activities, with joint engagement in the New Deal process and on the critical link between public financial management and security/justice reform. Joint support is also envisaged for aid coordination.

18. However, it is also clear that more has to be done. As outlined above, actions planned have been fully completed in some areas, while in others they have demonstrated good potential which needs to be consolidated. The remaining sections of the present report describe lessons learned and future direction in supporting national ownership, outreach, and expanded South-South and triangular cooperation and partnerships.

III. Lessons learned in supporting national ownership of institution-building in post-conflict settings

19. The General Assembly, in its resolution 66/255, and the Security Council, in its resolution 2086 (2013), both affirmed the fundamental principles of national ownership and stressed the importance of supporting national capacity development and institution-building, including through peacekeeping operations in accordance with their mandates. Support to national institutions is crucial to build confidence in transitions by demonstrating that national institutions can provide inclusive political processes, basic security, justice, social services and jobs.

20. We continue to learn how to translate national ownership into practice in supporting complex post-crisis institution-building as set out in the report of the Secretary-General on peacebuilding in the aftermath of conflict (A/67/499-S/2012/746). Lessons learned in this area have continued to draw on the relevant experience of field practitioners, as requested by the Assembly in its resolution 66/255, and highlight four key points:

(a) Enhancing national ownership means aligning with national decision-making cycles and understanding that progress is iterative. Institution-building depends on national priorities and decisions. National commitment is critical. While a common and broadly consulted national vision is necessary, those processes often take considerable national preparation and debate — as in the case of discussions in Côte d'Ivoire on security sector reform — and can go through multiple cycles. The timing of national decisions can therefore be uncertain, but the process needs to be respected and accommodated. This will inevitably require adjustments to institution-building support, for example, if national processes result in changing priorities and timings for international support. The United Nations therefore needs to pace and sequence its support to align with national decisions and processes and to ensure that national partners are fully committed to doing their part to build institutions and leverage United Nations support. Doing so may also require a careful assessment of which United Nations entity is best placed to support specific national institutions;

(b) Rapid confidence-building is key. International support in the aftermath of conflict needs to enable national institutions to show visible, early results to maintain political momentum. In Mali and Somalia, for example, national authorities have prioritized community-level infrastructure, social services and job creation for stabilization purposes, as well as early progress in reforms in the areas of governance, security and justice. United Nations presences need to move quickly to support the appropriate national institutions to deliver services that can help secure peace and build trust and promote progressive use of and alignment with country systems. This might mean bringing rapid advice, as with support to the national dialogue in Yemen or discussions on security sector reform in Côte d'Ivoire. It may also require modest but rapid financial assistance, and adapting programme delivery on the ground to give more visibility to the evolving role of national institutions during transitions;

(c) Building institutions requires sources of early and sustained financing as well as access to expertise. National authorities have primary responsibility for ensuring that there are sustainable and predictable sources of funding for institution-building through their national budgets. However, few countries after a conflict have staff in the right place with the right skills, coupled with equipment and facilities,

and the support of long-term predictable funding sources. Some countries, such as Libya and Timor-Leste, have had significant national resources to invest, but in most post-conflict countries, international financial assistance plays a key role. The international provision of short-term expertise and training, in the absence of policy, programme and financing frameworks, can lead to unsustainable substitution or the creation of individual capacity rather than organizational capability. A better approach is to embed assistance into programmes that support the national leadership vision, develop buy-in from many stakeholders and ensure sustainable funding that retains staff and supports long-term institution-building;

(d) Institution-building is a political as well as a technical process which takes time. In support of this duality, relevant Secretariat departments and agencies, funds, and programmes can bring complementary strengths. Agencies, funds, and programmes often have a depth and continuity of country knowledge, including a solid base of experience in capacity-building, and relationships that may have existed prior to mission arrival and that will undoubtedly exist after a mission departs, notwithstanding the role of the Department of Political Affairs in its continuous observation of country situations. Missions, in general, bring a powerful combination of civilian capacities, political leverage and field presence; in multidimensional peacekeeping operations, the mix of police, military and civilian capacities offers a particular strength (see Security Council resolution 2086 (2013). Missions and agencies, funds and programmes both have technical expertise. Combining these related but differing strengths should improve the quality of United Nations support to institution-building in relevant contexts.

21. These lessons have a number of implications for how the United Nations provides support to institution-building. While much support to institution-building is performed by agencies, funds, and programmes, the deployment of peacekeeping and special political missions provides both opportunities and challenges for the United Nations to better integrate efforts. The section below focuses on mission settings, where the mandated role of the mission in institution-building must be situated in the context of national priorities and capacities, and framed in the light of the roles of development actors — from the United Nations and beyond.

22. The measures outlined below provide clarifications requested by the General Assembly during its sixty-seventh session on the relationship to existing structures, business processes and oversight mechanisms. They include a systematic approach to strengthen existing integrated planning approaches through the life cycle of a mission, and enhanced provision of information on institution-building outcomes, planning assumptions, inputs and risks to the General Assembly through existing mechanisms, in particular reports and proposed budgets.

A. Integrating efforts

23. To ensure that the United Nations presence delivers together and leverages differing comparative advantage across the full range of actors present in the aftermath of conflict, missions and United Nations country teams will continue to strengthen joint action and clear division of labour to support political, security, and rule of law institution-building and the extension of state authority (see General Assembly resolution 67/226). Building on many examples of joint action in Liberia,

Libya, Mali, Somalia and elsewhere, senior leadership teams, supported by the necessary resources and capacities, will:

(a) Provide close direction to integrated assessment and planning processes through which missions and United Nations country teams identify ways to complement each other, both during mission start-up and at regular intervals thereafter, especially in institution-building support;

(b) Explore the use of joint delivery mechanisms, including integrated teams where appropriate, comprising mission and United Nations country team expertise and functions, such as those that have been established for electoral, constitutional and security and justice support with UNDP and other United Nations country team partners;

(c) Carefully plan and manage mission transition and drawdown to ensure the sustainability, measurement and benchmarking of capacity development gains, as well as continuity of support by the United Nations country team and partners.

24. Full consideration of institution-building requirements and needs must take place at the early stages of mission design and take into account from the onset the complementarity between the activities and strengths of the United Nations missions and country teams. In start-up mission situations, where senior mission leadership is not yet on the ground, support to institution-building in the aftermath of conflict must therefore be an organizational focus and commitment at the very early stages of the Headquarters-level mission planning and count upon the same senior guidance and engagement required at the country level.

25. Current capacities at headquarters to undertake integrated assessments and planning for institution-building support are limited. I will consider further the options available to address these requirements.

B. Aligning with national decision-making cycles

26. Translating national ownership into practice requires that mission formulation and implementation be sensitive to national decision-making cycles. In the Libyan context, in the immediate aftermath of the revolution, successive short-term mandates were intended to enable the United Nations to tailor its support to the requests, pace and absorptive capacities of national institutions. However, the lack of national capacity in many areas addressed in the mandate became apparent over a longer period of time, and despite extensive planning, the inability of national actors to absorb or utilize the technical advice the mission sought to offer in certain areas in its early stages revealed the importance of continuously assessing national capacity and national demand in real time and sequencing United Nations initiatives accordingly. The Policy on Integrated Assessment and Planning highlights this need to take account of national decision-making cycles. Accordingly, I will more systematically lay out the implications of national decision-making cycles in reports on country situations.

27. To provide a more thorough basis for decision-making by the General Assembly, mission planning and the consequent budget proposals will give more specific and distinct attention to mandated institution-building tasks and will articulate desired results that each mission will pursue from the outset of its

mandate, in conjunction with the United Nations country team. This strengthening of planning and design will include:

(a) More clearly delineated institution-building outcomes and design of activities in mission planning and, consequently, in proposed budgets;

(b) Description of how national decision-making cycles may affect activities in the narrative and planning assumptions of budget proposals and on how mission activities may adapt;

(c) Descriptions of the mix of inputs required (for example, various types of personnel) and the operational costs, within approved financial levels, to support institution-building objectives (for example, funds for national counterparts to attend training, necessary small infrastructure rehabilitation or materials for national institutions). When applicable, they would also indicate implementation through the United Nations country team.

28. Supporting evolving national requirements requires the ability to adapt the mix of civilian skills to respond to needs. In response to the request of the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions for an explanation as to how heads of mission now exercise the ability to make such changes, the applicable conditions and procedures have been set out in the standard operating procedures on staffing tables and post management in United Nations peacekeeping missions and special political missions. For non-staff expertise, such as consultants and individual contractors, missions are able to shape the scope of work to meet the functional requirements for expertise that evolve during the course of the year. Any redeployment of financial resources to accommodate a change from the originally planned volume of resources is carried out in compliance with the established policy for the administration of allotments.

C. Supporting rapid confidence-building in national institutions

29. To support rapid confidence-building, integrated assessment and planning processes are increasingly focusing on how the United Nations can support the capabilities and visibility of national institutions in delivering a few key outcomes in the political, security, justice, economic and social areas. Agencies, funds and programmes are adapting their support to do this: an example is the rapid and innovative "go to school" programme in Somalia, where UNICEF, working with Somali governmental institutions, has delivered results which would otherwise have been obtained through parallel systems. Ongoing work on resilience is further addressing this question.

30. In the justice and security sectors, and in the case of support to political processes and extension of State authority, there may be an urgent need for rapid institutional support which is not covered by existing programmes. For those sectors — and others as needed — senior leadership teams will use assessment and planning processes to identify situations where the absence of resources to support the basic functioning of national institutions in mandated areas may threaten peace and security and draw them to the attention of Member States.

31. Support for confidence-building also entails effective and timely provision of required expertise. The United Nations deploys this expertise through a range of modalities that have been developed over time. Staff resources, the main source of

civilian capacity, are complemented by other modalities to deploy expertise in a way that reflects the variety of functions, types of expertise needed, and the possibility of drawing from a wide range of sources of that expertise. For example, support for security sector reform, police, justice and corrections institutions, border management and core government functionality might draw on expertise from civil services of Member States, where such expertise generally resides, to be deployed through Government-provided personnel.[2] Consultancy services, while always a small part of mission personnel costs, may play a significant role in providing the ability to respond quickly to shifting national priorities. Applicable General Assembly resolutions and internal issuances must be complied with in the planning and implementation of each modality.

D. Ensuring that expert advice is linked to sustainable financing frameworks

32. Post-conflict public financial management is a promising area for cooperation between international financial institutions and the United Nations. There has been good collaboration in Afghanistan and Liberia, and there is new work under way in other countries. To acknowledge the importance of sustainable financing for institution-building, senior leadership teams will, within mandated areas:

(a) Work with host governments and partners to ensure that robust financing frameworks are in place to support resilient political, security and rule of law and security institutions;

(b) At the request of host governments, seek to work together with the World Bank and other international financial institutions to combine their public financial management analysis and support with United Nations professional sectoral expertise.[3]

33. Effective institution-building support requires a system-wide approach and joint action. At the country level, responsibilities hence rest with senior leadership teams, and I will update the General Assembly globally on progress through my reports on peacebuilding in the aftermath of conflict. Each entity of the United Nations system — including designated lead Secretariat departments and agencies, funds and programmes — is responsible for acting on those lessons in their own mandated areas and in accordance with the requirements of their governance structures.

34. While each national situation is unique and a one-size-fits-all approach must be avoided, it is clear that effective support for nationally owned institution-building requires the systematic consideration of the factors described above. **I recommend that the General Assembly encourage the application of the lessons learned and the measures described in paragraphs 19 through 33 above.**

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[2] Information on the differences between Government-provided personnel and type II gratis personnel was provided to the General Assembly in December 2012, following the recommendation of the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions. Information on deployments and nationality of such personnel will be reported on regularly. The forthcoming peacekeeping overview report will provide information on the guidelines, including their compliance with General Assembly resolutions 67/287 and 67/255.

[3] A toolkit for this activity is being developed.

35. **I call upon Member States to ensure sustained and predictable financing for the United Nations to support institution-building in the aftermath of conflict, in particular in supporting integrated efforts of the Secretariat, agencies, funds and programmes as outlined above.**

IV. Lessons learned in broadening and deepening the pool of civilian expertise for peacebuilding

36. The participation of Member States in CAPMATCH and the deployments highlighted in section II illustrate how outreach to Member States can help the United Nations to broaden and deepen the pool of civilian expertise for peacebuilding in the immediate aftermath of conflict, including from countries in the global South, with relevant experience in post-conflict peacebuilding or democratic transition and among neighbouring countries in a subregion.

37. They also demonstrate that the need for outreach holds true for peacekeeping operations and special political missions alike as well as across the range of regular modalities and business processes available to the United Nations and approved by the General Assembly and its organs.

38. The experience of the CAPMATCH pilot also demonstrates, however, the degree of effort and resources that are needed for the United Nations to engage in a close partnership with Member States, including those in the global South who have valuable experiences to share but who may not be able to avail themselves of the domestic systems to make those experiences easily available to others. The role of the CAPMATCH platform in supporting outreach in partnership with United Nations entities mandated for this purpose and the challenges experienced by it are highlighted in box 3.

Box 3
CAPMATCH pilot

The CAPMATCH pilot demonstrated the strength of demand from the field for increased access to specialized civilian capacities and showed the breadth of expertise available from untapped sources, including from conflict-affected countries, and across the global South. It also demonstrated, however, the need for the provision of human support to the automated tool and the need to apply established selection processes.

Demand focused on the core areas of United Nations peacebuilding that fall within mission mandates: security institutions; rule of law; political institutions; and core government functionality. Approximately 85 per cent of requests in CAPMATCH were from missions and their lead departments at Headquarters. Agencies, funds, and programmes made limited use of the system and relied on their existing networks and outreach mechanisms.

The outreach team was able to establish a strong network of contacts within Member States (50 registrants, of which 69 per cent are from the global South). Work performed by the team was conducted as

supplementary outreach in support of established procedures. Over the pilot period of the initiative, deployments were supported in six country situations and sectors (see section II above), in addition to assisting in expanding the pool for outreach to multiple duty stations.

In practice, the business process of outreach was labour intensive. The team was often required to manage differences between the way in which demand was requested and the manner in which civilian expertise was available. Supporting requests often included an element of lessons learned on the level at which personnel should be solicited in order to attract the right seniority of expertise. For example, a request for expertise in legislative drafting for South Sudan was reissued to identify someone at a more senior level in order to solicit the right experience using Government-provided personnel. Time frames were subject to change, and the team had to work closely with Member States to support the processes of identifying the right expertise to nominate and respond to questions on needs.

Member States engaging with the process also identified a set of challenges internal to their processes, in particular for those who do not have a tradition of providing civilian personnel through the United Nations. They included how to identify relevant areas of niche expertise, procedures for the release from and re-entry into the national service of personnel, and for some, the legislative basis for deployments. The work of the independent civilian capacities network, which brought together Brazil, China, Egypt, India, Indonesia, Norway, South Africa, Russia and Turkey for a series of meetings in Bali, Indonesia, Brasilia, Moscow and Oslo, has helped to clarify those challenges, as seen by Member States.

Efforts at outreach were welcomed to help work through those challenges. Member States wanted engagement in a manner that could promise a sustained relationship over the long term, as there were a number of issues for both parties to work out to make deployments possible. The lessons from the CAPMATCH pilot also highlighted the importance of the systems established by the Department of Field Support and the Office of Rule of Law and Security Institutions of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations for outreach, and of the demand of both Member States and missions to intensify those efforts. There was a clear sense that Member States wanted to engage with the United Nations, both within the normal structures of the Secretariat and through established selection processes.

39. Drawing on the lessons learned from the pilot, I intend to: (a) discard the idea of automated matching; and (b) strengthen outreach efforts at Headquarters to broaden and deepen the pool of civilian capacities available to support institution-building tasks mandated to missions.

40. Those efforts will include a particular focus on deepening the pool of civilian capacities to support the emergence of national institutions that can address the specific challenges related to gender in post-conflict situations, as outlined, inter

alia, in Security Council resolutions 1325 (2000) and 1820 (2008) and in my report on women's participation in peacebuilding (A/65/354-S/2010/466).

41. They should also draw on the findings of the review of the United Nations gender architecture in post-conflict countries, led by UN-Women in partnership with the Department of Political Affairs, the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, OHCHR, UNICEF, UNDP and the United Nations Population Fund, which emphasized the need to increase the availability of specialized gender expertise across a range of post-conflict institutional needs and substantive areas within mission mandates, such as disarmament, demobilization and reintegration, security sector reform or the rule of law. The demand for, and value of, such support is illustrated by experiences such as the recent exchanges between Côte d'Ivoire and Senegal, financed by the Peacebuilding Fund, in promoting women in security command structures and establishing gender-sensitive police services. I am committed to appoint more women protection advisers to peacekeeping missions to address gender-based violence, as well as to ensure gender expertise in integrated assessment and planning and at the highest levels of mission management, and to encourage continued collaboration between United Nations missions and country teams on these issues.

42. More broadly, my aim is to ensure that peacekeeping and special political missions are supported by a field-focused workforce planning and outreach capacity within the headquarters that is aligned with the Organization's reform initiatives and imperatives, and that helps peacekeeping and special political missions to access the expertise necessary to successfully implement their mandates.

43. The units that currently perform outreach are overstretched. The Office of Rule of Law and Security Institutions currently has one full-time position budgeted for thematic outreach for criminal law and judicial advisory services for over 400 advisory positions of corrections and justice experts in peacekeeping and special political missions that provide institution-building advice and expertise. The situation is even more severe in the Field Personnel Division of the Department of Field Support, where one full-time position is designated for monitoring and coordinating outreach activities for all position requirements in missions.

44. To effectively support peacekeeping and special political missions, future outreach activities must be linked to a strengthened workforce planning approach so as to focus on the identification of the critical gaps in capacity and determine where the optimum source of suitable candidates may be found and how to mobilize them promptly. To do so, the Department of Field Support plans to propose to strengthen within existing resources the capacity of the Field Personnel Division to perform those functions. Those functional elements, together with thematic subject matter experts in the Office of Rule of Law and Security Institutions and other functional elements within the Department of Peacekeeping Operations and the Department of Political Affairs, will then be in a better position to leverage their allotted resources to ensure that peacekeeping and special political missions will receive the civilian capacities they need to successfully deliver on their mandates.

45. **I recommend that the General Assembly support the strengthening, within existing resources, of the capacity of the Department of Field Support to carry out workforce planning and outreach. In complement to those efforts, I recommend that Member States commit additional voluntary technical and**

financial resources to increase outreach to the global South within the United Nations system.

V. Lessons learned in enhancing regional, South-South, and triangular cooperation and partnerships with international financial institutions

46. In is resolution 66/255, the General Assembly identified enhanced regional, South-South and triangular cooperation as a key element of institution-building in the aftermath of conflict. This approach recognizes that support delivered though the United Nations system is only a portion of the overall assistance needed to support national institutions.

47. Over the past few years, a number of South-South cooperation and triangular exchanges have delivered good results, such as from the South Sudan Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) project, which is now well evaluated, to exchanges between Somalia and Timor-Leste; Côte d'Ivoire and African countries that have gone through disarmament, demobilization and reintegration and security sector reform processes; and Liberia and Sierra Leone. Further examples are detailed in box 4.

Box 4
Lessons learned — promoting South-South and triangular exchanges of institution-building experiences

In Yemen, UNDP assisted the Government in developing the Youth Economic Empowerment Project, which provides youth with rapid employment in a first phase and evolves to provide matching funds for business development, complemented by technical advice. This programme builds upon the experience of youth empowerment and sustainable livelihoods programme in Burundi, linked to the reintegration of combatants, with financial support from Japan and the Republic of Korea. The ability of UNDP to draw upon expertise developed in different post-conflict country programmes was critical in developing this exchange.

The Government of Liberia requested assistance, with the support of Sweden, to draw on experiences from Sierra Leone to strengthen revenue collection. While an initial exchange was ultimately successful, the delays experienced highlighted the need for the involvement of United Nations operational entities to liaise between the host government and providers. The United Nations Mission in Liberia and UNDP played this role.

Building upon the experience of Brazil in strengthening national capacity in school feeding, nutrition and food security, the World Food Programme (WFP) partnered with the Government of Brazil to establish the Centre of Excellence against Hunger. The Centre used the lessons learned from Brazil to provide technical assistance to other countries, such as Côte d'Ivoire, Guinea, Liberia, Mali, Rwanda and Timor-Leste. The involvement of WFP in identifying opportunities to apply relevant

experiences was important in achieving results and disseminating information about the programme.

48. The lessons from those experiences are that:

(a) There is demand from post-conflict countries and a willingness to engage with Northern and Southern Member States;

(b) Realizing the benefits of such exchanges takes operational linkages in the field, and at the global level, to facilitate dialogue with host and provider countries, prepare exchanges and support them on the ground.

49. The United Nations has also documented evolving approaches from within Member States, both Northern and Southern providers.[4] Southern countries often involve their domestic sector and provincial agencies to provide assistance to post-conflict countries and other partners ("sector solidarity"). This approach is in line with the argument made by conflict-affected countries in favour of an increase in peer-to-peer exchanges. Northern cooperation, while less closely linked to domestic experiences of institutional transformation, also brings decades of experience and the ability to connect technical cooperation to broader sources of financing, such as general or sector-specific budget support and rehabilitation projects. The approaches are complementary and can be productively drawn upon in a more coordinated manner.

50. In line with requests expressed by Member States (see General Assembly resolution 67/226), and in order to address the aforementioned challenges, the United Nations system will endeavour to offer more structured support to Member States for South-South and triangular partnerships. This may include:

(a) Provision of support at the country level, which could take five main forms:

(i) Stand-alone South-South and triangular programmes, such as the IGAD exchange;

(ii) Incorporation of South-South and triangular exchanges into broader institution-building projects and programmes financed through the United Nations agencies, funds and programmes;

(iii) Facilitation of sector planning arrangements that involve both Northern and Southern countries;

(iv) Facilitation of twinning arrangements between agencies in post-conflict countries and those with relevant post-conflict transition or capacity-building experiences;

(v) Exploration of the potential for deepening the role of diaspora, the private sector and private foundations as sources for both resources and technical expertise to support institution-building;

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[4] *Institution-building in post-conflict and post-crisis situations: Scaling up South-South and triangular cooperation*, United Nations Civilian Capacity initiative, 2013; and http://ssc.undp.org.

(b) Outreach to Member States, in particular Southern providers, on post-conflict needs and possible instruments to respond thereto. Where requested by governments, this may include exchanges on technical issues related to lessons learned on how to structure, coordinate and prepare the supply of expertise within broader programmes;

(c) Documentation of Southern experiences in institution-building in the aftermath of conflict, and exchanges among Member States on lessons learned;

(d) Development of standard operational instruments, such as model legal agreements.

51. UNDP will play a particularly important role in this area, drawing on networks of engagement with governments in post-conflict settings and provider countries in the North and the South, the tools and dialogue forums developed by the United Nations Office for South-South Cooperation and the partnerships it has established with organizations such as the International Organization for Migration, the United Nations Capital Development Fund, UN-Women and the World Bank. Where additional programmatic resources are required, specific proposals for voluntary contributions will be presented to interested Member States. The Peacebuilding Support Office is also well positioned to support, through the Peacebuilding Fund, priority programmes defined at the country level that include South-South and triangular cooperation for institutional strengthening in post-conflict settings.

52. A second key partnership is with international financial institutions (see General Assembly resolution 67/226). Together with the President of the World Bank, I have made efforts to deepen the partnership between the United Nations and the World Bank to benefit countries in post-conflict situations. During our joint visits to the Great Lakes Region and the Sahel, accompanied by other international leaders, we listened to the views of governments and civil society leaders, and we have worked together to mobilize much needed resources to support national and regional peacebuilding.

53. The more detailed operational work to support the partnership between the World Bank and the United Nations has demonstrated many specific areas of complementarity. For example, the resources developed to address security and justice planning and budgeting are a very positive example of using the comparative advantages of both institutions to address a need which neither would be able to address alone — for the United Nations, specialized expertise on security, police, justice and corrections; for the World Bank, detailed technical analysis of public expenditure. The "menu of options" described above highlights similar complementarities.

54. As the World Bank establishes its global practices in the coming months, we are ready to work together to deepen this work on public administration and to initiate a new partnership on the creation of employment. The United Nations also stands ready to deepen partnerships with other organizations: for example, the Peacebuilding Support Office and UNDP are in dialogue with the African Development Bank, the European Union and the World Bank on transition financing instruments, and we have consulted with the African Development Bank on the directions of its High-level Panel on Fragile States.

55. A third key partnership is with regional organizations. There is significant interest in deepening cooperation on support to national institution-building,

including in the areas of electoral and rule of law activities. The League of Arab States framed civilian capacities as the topic of its biennial sectoral meeting this year and developed an action plan for follow-up. One agreed action, a joint training on post-conflict needs assessments, is scheduled for January 2014. The African Union, through the African Solidarity Initiative, has initiated exchanges on the institution-building needs of a number of its member States, and the United Nations is committed to supporting this process.

56. There are also untapped opportunities to mobilize regional and subregional financing partnerships. My recent visits to the Great Lakes Region and the Sahel have demonstrated that some of the needs of post-conflict countries require action at the subregional level that provides assistance that builds institutional trust across borders and links assistance in one country to assistance in their neighbours. This approach to regional peacebuilding support and the exchange of civilian capacities, information and knowledge on institution-building in the aftermath of conflict needs to be strengthened in the coming years under the leadership of regional organizations and with the active involvement of intergovernmental bodies, the United Nations and bilateral donors. The Peacebuilding Commission is well positioned to support those linkages.

57. **I urge Member States to support UNDP, in conjunction with other United Nations entities, in facilitating South-South and triangular partnerships for peacebuilding.**

VI. Conclusions, observations and recommendations

58. The United Nations has made progress on the ground in knowledge products and through organizational arrangements to support crucial areas of institution-building in the aftermath of conflict. These include: overall guidance on capacity-building and integrated planning, and the consolidation of organizational arrangements in the areas of police, justice and corrections; inclusive political processes; and core government functionality. Those efforts are showing results in the field in terms of new approaches to national institution-building in situations such as in Somalia and the identification of experience and expertise from countries that have gone through post-conflict and democratic transition, in particular in the global South.

59. We have not completed everything we set out to do, but have learned lessons along the way. In so doing, we have had a fruitful dialogue among the Secretariat, the agencies, funds and programmes, and Member States, which has demonstrated the continued need for closer collaboration. I view the area of support to civilian capacities and national institution-building as a crucial area of partnership among the Secretariat, agencies, funds and programmes, and Member States and other partners.

60. Building on that dialogue, the present report focuses on a smaller number of actions to improve delivery at the country level, implemented through existing mandated structures and processes.

61. **National ownership of institution-building: I recommend that the General Assembly encourage the application of the lessons learned and the measures described in paragraphs 19 through 33 above. I call upon Member States to**

ensure sustained and predictable financing for the United Nations to support institution-building in the aftermath of conflict, in particular in supporting integrated efforts of the Secretariat, agencies, funds and programmes as outlined above.

62. **Outreach: I recommend that the General Assembly support the strengthening, within existing resources, of the capacity of the Department of Field Support to carry out workforce planning and outreach. In complement to those efforts, I recommend that Member States commit additional voluntary technical and financial resources to increase outreach to the global South within the United Nations system.**

63. **South-South and triangular cooperation: I urge Member States to support UNDP, in conjunction with other United Nations entities, in facilitating South-South and triangular partnerships for peacebuilding.**

64. The present report is the final report of the civilian capacities initiative as a stand-alone initiative and marks the beginning of a concerted effort across the United Nations system, to apply key lessons on institution-building and deepen our partnerships with Member States and other key actors.

65. The United Nations remains committed, with the support of the Member States, to doing more. The pathways to peace are complex, but we must continue to strive to be more responsive to the citizens of countries emerging from conflict so that we may help to strengthen national institutions which, in the end, are the only durable bulwark against the risks of repeated insecurity.

United Nations A/68/696/Corr.1–S/2014/5/Corr.1

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General Assembly
Sixty-eighth session
Agenda items 53, 124 and 132

Comprehensive review of the whole question of peacekeeping operations in all their aspects

Strengthening of the United Nations system

Review of the efficiency of the administrative and financial functioning of the United Nations

Security Council
Sixty-ninth year

Civilian capacity in the aftermath of conflict

Report of the Secretary-General

Corrigendum

Paragraph 4

For the existing text *substitute*

4. The General Assembly, in its resolution 66/255, the Security Council, in its resolution 2086 (2013) and presidential statement of 21 January 2011 (S/PRST/2011/2), and the Peacebuilding Commission have all recognized the criticality of national ownership in peacebuilding, the importance of enabling global capacities to support national institutions and the need for strengthened cooperation and coordination within the United Nations activities on peacebuilding.

14-23272 (E) 120214

Please recycle

United Nations A/68/697

General Assembly

Distr.: General
8 January 2014

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Sixty-eighth session
Agenda item 132
Review of the efficiency of the administrative and financial functioning of the United Nations

Third progress report on the accountability system in the United Nations Secretariat

Report of the Secretary-General

Summary

The Secretary-General has the honour to transmit to the General Assembly a report on progress made towards the implementation of the accountability framework, as requested by the Assembly in its resolution 67/253. The report informs Member States of the measures taken and planned by the Secretary-General to strengthen accountability in response to that resolution. It also explains how the various initiatives reported in his annual progress reports on accountability and related reports constitute part of a comprehensive change process aimed at making the United Nations a more accountable and better managed organization.

14-20230 (E) 140214

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I. Introduction

1. The present report is submitted in response to General Assembly resolution 67/253, in which the Assembly requested the Secretary-General to report to it at the first part of its resumed sixty-eighth session on the implementation of the resolution.

2. The report provides an overview of how the various accountability and related reform initiatives constitute a comprehensive process aimed at making the United Nations a more accountable and better managed organization. In response to specific requests by the General Assembly, it includes an action plan for implementing results-based management in a phased manner, provides an update on the implementation of enterprise risk management and describes the progress made since the previous annual report on accountability (A/67/714) in a number of areas noted by the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions in its related report to the General Assembly (A/67/776).

II. Overview

3. Accountability is the cornerstone upon which an effective and trustworthy organization is built. This is why the Secretary-General has been working closely with all United Nations stakeholders to implement a series of business transformation initiatives that will strengthen the accountability system and enable the Organization to deliver more effectively on its mandates while ensuring the proper stewardship of its resources.

4. Over the past few years the Secretary-General has presented a number of reports on accountability to the General Assembly (see, for example, A/60/312, A/60/846/Add.2 and A/62/701). But it was only with the adoption of resolution 64/259 that the Assembly, on the basis of the proposal of the Secretary-General (see A/64/640, para. 10), decided on a definition of accountability for the Secretariat that established the different components of the accountability system and the interrelationship among these components, as shown in figure I.

Figure I
Accountability system of the United Nations Secretariat



5. In resolution 64/259, the Assembly also requested the Secretary-General to implement a series of actions to strengthen accountability throughout the Organization and to report on the implementation of those actions at the next session of the Assembly. This mandate opened an important dialogue on accountability with Member States in which the Secretariat submits a progress report on the subject each year and Member States issue resolutions requesting the Secretariat to adopt different measures to strengthen its accountability system and to report thereon at the subsequent session of the Assembly (see, most recently, A/66/692 and A/67/714, and Assembly resolutions 66/257 and 67/253).

6. The present report, which is the third progress report on accountability, not only informs Member States of the measures taken by the Secretary-General to strengthen accountability in response to Assembly resolution 67/253, but also explains how all of the initiatives reported in his annual progress reports — and other reports related to the topic — constitute part of a comprehensive process aimed at making the United Nations a more accountable and better managed organization.

A. Building blocks of a more accountable United Nations

7. In his report of 29 January 2010 (A/64/640, para. 6), the Secretary-General stated that "strengthening an accountability system in an organization as complex as the United Nations is a daunting task and a continuous process". To this end, the

Secretariat has implemented (or is in the process of implementing) a variety of initiatives that can be organized under the following categories.

Stronger focus on performance and results

8. In his second progress report (A/67/714), the Secretary-General proposed a conceptual framework for results-based management. In response to that proposal, in its resolution 67/253, the General Assembly requested the Secretary-General to start implementing the conceptual framework in a phased manner and to develop an action plan for strengthening the implementation of results-based management. This action plan, which is included in section III of the present report, together with the implementation of the International Public Sector Accounting Standards (IPSAS) and Umoja Extension 2, will lead to significant improvements in the planning, budgeting, monitoring and evaluation cycle of the Organization.

9. In addition, several initiatives have been introduced since 2010 to strengthen individual performance and the accountability of senior managers. These measures include extending the senior managers' compacts to the heads of field missions; restructuring the senior managers' compacts to reflect the main components included in the definition of accountability; and strengthening the performance management and development system, which applies to staff at all levels and will be the subject of further adjustments to be presented to the General Assembly at its sixty-ninth session.

Improving governance and oversight

10. The different initiatives under this category include redefining the roles of the Management Committee and the Management Performance Board to take on more responsibility for advising the Secretary-General on the management of the Organization, and strengthening the analysis of the oversight bodies' observations and recommendations by senior managers to ensure that they are fed into the management process and implemented in a timely and effective manner. In addition, the Administration engages in a continuous dialogue with the oversight bodies to share perspectives on issues of mutual concern and to strengthen, collectively, the management of the Organization.

11. It is also important to note the progress made by the Secretariat in the implementation of enterprise risk management. The policy framework has already been issued, the Secretariat-wide risk assessment exercise will be finalized during the first quarter of 2014, and an action plan in this area is included in section IV of the present report. In addition, heads of peacekeeping and special political missions continue to employ risk management practices in their decision-making, and chief fiduciaries are required to provide letters of representation at the end of each financial period.

12. There has also been an improvement in the management reporting systems aimed at providing managers important information to guide their decision-making (e.g., the human resources management scorecard and the financial reports that are discussed by the Management Committee). This is an area where the Organization will progress to a more qualitative stage as the benefits of the implementation of IPSAS and the enterprise resource planning system (Umoja) start to be realized.

13. Finally, there has also been important progress in strengthening ethics and integrity in the Organization and in the areas of communications and transparency, including the accountability portal on iSeek; the availability of the senior managers' compacts and annual performance assessments on iSeek; and making public all audit and evaluation reports of the oversight bodies on their respective websites.[1]

Better management and administration

14. This is another area where the Organization has made important headway since 2010. The promulgation of one series of staff rules, which consolidated the three previously applicable series, has strengthened accountability by holding staff at all levels to the same standards in terms of conduct as well as performance. In addition, the introduction of the talent management system (Inspira) in the area of human resources management, as well as the procurement-related reforms, have contributed to improved transparency and accountability in all of these processes. Much progress has also been made in the peacekeeping operations. For example, the Department of Peacekeeping Operations and the Department of Field Support are addressing recommendations from an evaluation of the command and control arrangements in peacekeeping operations. In addition, they have implemented an integrated conduct and discipline framework and advanced a policy on accountability for conduct and discipline in field missions, and are developing guidance on criminal accountability.

B. International Public Sector Accounting Standards and Umoja: bringing greater accountability, governance and oversight

15. The implementation of IPSAS and Umoja underpins the progress described above and is further strengthening the Organization's accountability in the areas of results and performance, governance and oversight and better management and administration, as illustrated in figure II. These two important business transformation initiatives will substantially change the way the Secretariat does its work by increasing the availability of timely and complete information, thereby enabling faster decision-making and providing for better service delivery through improved planning and implementation of activities and better measurement of results. In addition, these two projects, which are at the core of the Organization's efforts to improve its administrative processes, will introduce elements of continuous change that will require the Organization to harmonize and enhance its working practices and staff members to update their skills in different areas. The capabilities of Member States for exercising their oversight responsibilities will be also significantly improved.

[1] By its resolution 67/258, the General Assembly requested the Secretary-General to entrust the Office of Internal Oversight Services with publishing audit reports on the website of the Office, on an experimental basis, by no later than 1 July 2013, until 31 December 2014. A final decision on the continuation of this practice is expected to be made in the context of the review of the mandate of the Office of Internal Oversight Services at the sixty-ninth session of the General Assembly.

Figure II

Umoja and the International Public Sector Accounting Standards providing the basis for a more accountable Secretariat


STRENGTHENING ACCOUNTABILITY IN THE UNITED NATIONS SECRETARIAT
STRONGER FOCUS ON PERFORMANCE AND RESULTS
IMPROVED GOVERNANCE AND OVERSIGHT
BETTER MANAGEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION
• Results-based management
• Senior managers' compacts
• Performance management and development system
• Management reporting systems
• Enterprise risk management and internal control framework
• Ethics and integrity
• Communications and transparency
• One series of staff rules and contractual reforms
• Improved management processes:
- Talent management
- Procurement reform
UMOJA
IPSAS

International Public Sector Accounting Standards

16. The United Nations System Accounting Standards (UNSAS) were developed in the early 1990s and were "tailor-made" for the United Nations following General Assembly decision 46/445. These standards are no longer sufficient to respond to the legitimate concerns of United Nations stakeholders and their demands for transparency and information.

17. By its resolution 60/283, the General Assembly approved the adoption of the accruals-based International Public Sector Accounting Standards (IPSAS). These standards have been independently developed specifically for the public sector and are more precise and detailed than UNSAS, leaving far less scope for inconsistent interpretation.

18. In addition to the five key benefits identified by the Secretary-General (see A/60/846/Add.3, para. 15), the adoption of IPSAS by the United Nations will strengthen accountability through better performance analysis and management and improved governance and oversight, as described below:

- The introduction of accrual accounting per se is a commitment to promote enhanced accountability and to improve the management of the Organization's financial resources. Accrual accounting allows the Organization to report its results on a consistent and comparable basis. In addition, the preparation of the financial reports under this system, by providing a clearer picture of the Organization's liabilities (such as employee salaries and benefits), allows all stakeholders to have a more comprehensive view of the Organization's financial position, performance and cash flows and a better assessment of how well the United Nations has used its available resources
- IPSAS increases transparency by requiring more financial transactions to be recognized or disclosed either in financial statements (such as inventory, intangible assets, accounts payable, accrued staff benefits, etc.) or in notes to financial statements. In addition, independent standards such as IPSAS have

been vetted by third parties and oblige participating organizations to improve their managerial practices

- The high-quality financial reporting generated by IPSAS contributes to quality decision-making, leading to better governance, management, transparency and trust and to the enhanced ability of Member States to exercise their oversight responsibilities and hold the Organization accountable
- Financial information is available more frequently (yearly instead of every two years), which increases the ability of management and Member States to gain better control over the financial resources of the Organization, identify key trends and variances and introduce timely corrective measures, where necessary
- Finally, by providing more comprehensive information on costs and high-quality information on financial statements, IPSAS is a catalyst for improved implementation of results-based management

Umoja

19. The qualitative and quantitative benefits of Umoja have been outlined by the Secretary-General in previous reports submitted to the General Assembly (see A/64/380, sect. II; A/65/389, sect. II; A/66/381, sect. IV.D; A/67/360, sect. III.G; and A/68/375, sect. III.F). The present report provides an opportunity to further explain how Umoja will enhance accountability and transparency in the Organization, as follows:

- *More integrated management processes*. The implementation of the full scope of Umoja (Foundation and Extensions 1 and 2) will reach the most important managerial spheres of the Organization's operations. It will provide management with an integrated and detailed view of the overall performance of its different functional areas, making visible the dependencies that exist among them and how their individual performance is impacting the overall performance of the Organization. This will provide the opportunity to introduce timely corrective measures and to hold accountable those managers who might not be delivering as expected
- *Increased transparency and more effective risk management*. Having a more integrated picture of the Organization's performance, rather than relying on the numerous existing information sources, will make the financial situation and performance of the Organization more transparent, facilitate the introduction of corrective measures and improve the effectiveness of the risk management process
- *Better governance and increased management effectiveness*. Umoja will make available more accurate and timely performance and enterprise management information, thereby enhancing better governance, decision-making and performance
- *Consistent interpretation and application of all regulations, rules, policies and principles related to the management of resources*. A major risk to the operation of a global organization such as the Secretariat is having many of its processes and procedures managed without effective tools to enforce them and subject to different interpretations, as this could cause control exposure and

lead to errors that may bring about financial losses to the Organization (e.g., through overpayments or litigation). By operating as a single platform, Umoja will enforce the common interpretation of the regulations, rules and policies related to the management of resources, facilitating more effective control and auditability systems

- *Greater operational efficiency*. By consolidating most of the data the Organization uses in a single platform and linking business processes, Umoja will allow for significant cost savings and productivity gains. For example, Umoja will enable United Nations managers to get the right resources in the right place at the right time, improving inventory management, bringing more rationality to the procurement process and minimizing shortfalls

- *More efficient workflows*. Umoja is catalysing the introduction and adoption of new ways of doing business. The revision of some of the workflows is improving the managerial practices of the Organization, bringing more efficiency and stronger segregation of duties and delegation of authorities by linking user access to the individuals' authorized delegations

- *Contributing to the development of a cohesive and fully integrated information and communications technology strategy*. The implementation of Umoja will be a catalyser for the development of an integrated information and communications technology strategy which will place the achievement of the Organization's mandates and the necessary support of Umoja at its centre

- *Improved audit processes and fewer possibilities for mismanagement*. Umoja will make it easier to compile and report on any information required by the auditors and/or investigators. In addition, it will be easier to identify and understand who has access to what information and/or decision and how such access has been used

- *"Big data": better oversight and management*. "Big data" will be introduced in the Secretariat in the context of Umoja implementation. This platform will enable the Secretariat to perform data mining and will offer new possibilities for management and internal auditors to analyse the business processes. For example, managers and auditors will be able to analyse not only samples of the population, but the entire population. In addition, Umoja will imply a significant step forward in the reliability of information, creating "a single version of the truth"

- *Improved results-based management*. The implementation of the full scope of Umoja (Foundation and Extensions 1 and 2) will improve the implementation of results-based management by allowing the link between results and the utilisation of resources

III. Results-based management

A. The mandates

20. In response to the Secretary-General's second progress report (A/67/714), the General Assembly, in paragraphs 5 and 6 of its resolution 67/253, requested the Secretary-General to start implementing the results-based management framework

in a phased manner and to further refine the framework by taking certain factors into account. The measures taken in response to that request are described below.

21. To devise the means of fulfilling these mandates, the Under-Secretary-General for Management convened a working group on results-based management whose members broadly represent the functional units responsible for the different areas of work of the Organization.[2] The findings and recommendations of the working group are set out below. It is important to note that while the Secretariat will make every effort to implement these recommendations according to a "phased approach", some of the recommendations would require additional resources beyond what the Secretariat currently has available. For this reason the proposed time frame for implementation is two consecutive bienniums.

B. Findings and recommendations of the results-based management working group

22. The findings and recommendations of the results-based management working group, together with the responsible entities and implementation dates, are shown in the table below.

Topic finding	*Recommendation*	*Responsible entity*	*Implementation dates*
Commitment of senior management Members of the working group agreed on the importance of leadership and setting the appropriate "tone at the top" to move forward with the implementation of results-based management	The Secretary-General should lead a high-level advocacy and outreach campaign to emphasize to senior managers and staff the need for the Organization to focus more on the achievement of clearly defined results	Executive Office of the Secretary-General (with the substantive support of the Department of Management and the Department of Public Information)	2014-2017
	The Management Performance Board should emphasize the joint assessment of institutional performance and the performance of individual senior managers, in accordance with section 1 of the Secretary-General's bulletin defining the Board's terms of reference (ST/SGB/2013/2)[a]	Management Performance Board (with the substantive support of the Department of Management)	2014-2017

[2] The members of the working group include the Office of the Under-Secretary-General for Management (Chair), the Office of Programme Planning, Budget and Accounts and the Office of Human Resources Management in the Department of Management; the Department of Peacekeeping Operations; the Department of Economic and Social Affairs; the Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC); the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs; the United Nations Office at Geneva; the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR); and Umoja.

Topic finding	*Recommendation*	*Responsible entity*	*Implementation dates*
Capacity-building Members of the working group found that a lack of capacity for results-based management at its different stages (preparation of logical frameworks that are at the core of the programme, planning and budgeting processes, programme monitoring and reporting, results-based management in general, etc.) undermines the quality of results-based management in the Secretariat	The Department of Management, in coordination with the respective "process owners" of results-based management, should organize training courses on the preparation of logical frameworks tailor-made to individual departments and offices depending on the nature of the mandates/work: substantive, normative, operational and/or administrative	Office of Programme Planning, Budget and Accounts	2014-2017
	The Department of Management, in coordination with the respective "process owners", should provide guidelines and training on results-based management and on how to create linkages between staff workplans and the objectives of the Organization[b]	Department of Management (Office of the Under-Secretary-General, Office of Programme Planning, Budget and Accounts and Office of Human Resources Management)	2014-2017
	The Department of Management, in coordination with the respective "process owners", should provide training courses on programme monitoring and reporting in the Secretariat	Office of the Under-Secretary-General, Department of Management	2014-2017
	Responsible heads of departments and offices, as "process owners", should provide training courses on evaluation methodologies and techniques	Individual departments (with the support of the Office of the Under-Secretary-General, Department of Management, and the Office of Internal Oversight Services)	Third quarter of 2014 through 2017
Guidelines and toolkits Members of the working group found that to strengthen institutional and individual capacities for results-based management and to foster a common understanding of this concept within the Secretariat, a	The Department of Management should develop a results-based management manual, including related policies and practical guidance for using a results-based management approach in all related areas of work	Office of the Under-Secretary-General, Department of Management, in coordination with the Office of Programme Planning, Budget and Accounts and the Office of Human Resources Management	2014-2017[c]

Topic finding	*Recommendation*	*Responsible entity*	*Implementation dates*
results-based management manual should be developed. An e-learning programme on results-based management should also be part of this toolkit			
	The Department of Management should develop an e-learning tool on results-based management	Office of the Under-Secretary-General, Department of Management, in coordination with the Office of Programme Planning, Budget and Accounts and the Office of Human Resources Management	2014-2017[c]
Umoja and results-based management As the results-based management working group is comprised of senior programme managers drawn from the different functional areas of the Organization, their active participation in the confirmation of the business requirements for Umoja will help the Organization achieve the mandates stated in paragraph 5 (b) of resolution 67/253	The Umoja Steering Committee should consider requesting the extension of the mandate and responsibilities of the working group to confirm the business requirements for the design of Umoja Extension 2, as it relates to results-based management	Umoja Steering Committee	2014-2017

[a] Section 1 of the bulletin already establishes that one of the main responsibilities of the Board is to monitor the performance of senior managers and heads of mission in achieving the objectives, results and targets contained in their compacts and the programme and planning documents.

[b] Section 6.1 of the administrative instruction on the Performance Management and Development System (ST/AI/2010/5) already states that the "priorities of heads of departments/offices/missions are translated into workplans of workunits as per each department/office/mission structure. Work unit plans are developed in consultation with staff members concerned on an annual or biennial basis, depending on the needs of the department/office/mission".

[c] The manual and the e-learning tool are to be updated after Umoja Extension 2 has been deployed to reflect the "technicalities" that might be introduced by Umoja in the programme planning, budget, monitoring, reporting and evaluation processes of the Secretariat.

C. Lessons learned and challenges related to the implementation of results-based management

23. Extensive literature exists, both in the United Nations system and in other organizations, on the lessons learned and the challenges faced by different organizations when implementing results-based management. Following is a brief discussion of lessons and challenges most relevant to the Secretariat.

Lessons learned

Resources

24. The implementation of results-based management cannot be conducted as a narrow technical exercise. Instead it must be treated as an institutional and change management initiative that requires resources to succeed.

Fostering senior-level leadership

25. The best practice as identified by Mayne[3] is that fostering senior-level leadership in results-based management is fundamental, that is, getting senior managers to visibly, regularly and consistently lead and support results-based management through their words and actions.

Building a linkage between results-based management and the performance appraisal systems

26. Best practice suggests that performance appraisals should be informed by results and results-based management information.

Incentives and disincentives

27. There need to be incentives in place for managers and staff to use a results-based management approach, which in an organization such as the United Nations can be difficult to promote. These incentives should be tailored to the management practices and culture of the organization. According to Bester,[4] it is equally important to remove formal and informal disincentives to results-based management that might exist.

Capacity development

28. Training on the application of results-based management is required not only for practitioners and field staff but also for senior management and staff at all levels in order to foster support and understanding of results-based management throughout the Organization. Motivating senior managers to embrace results-based management is contingent on their seeing value in devoting time and resources to acquiring and using results information.[5]

Accountability

29. Accountability is critical for effective results-based management. Results-based management is unlikely to succeed if there is no institutional or individual accountability for results.

[3] John Mayne, "Best practices in results-based management: a review of experience: a report for the United Nations Secretariat", vol. I, main report (July 2007).

[4] Angela Bester, "Results-based management in the United Nations development system: progress and challenges: a report prepared for the United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, for the quadrennial comprehensive policy review", final report (July 2012).

[5] David Try and Zoe Radnor, "Developing an understanding of results-based management through public value theory", *International Journal of Public Sector Management*, vol. 20, No. 7 (2007), pp. 655-673.

Challenges

30. Once all the results-based management instruments and tools are in place in an organization, many of the key challenges are organizational and behavioural rather than technical.[6] In addition, time is needed to allow these organizational changes to mature.

Outcomes and achievements

31. Most organizations are good at defining and measuring results at the output level as outputs are generally measurable and directly influenced by the activities controlled by programme managers. In the United Nations Secretariat, regulation 6.1 of the Regulations and Rules Governing Programme Planning, the Programme Aspects of the Budget, the Monitoring of Implementation and the Methods of Evaluation (ST/SGB/2000/8) establishes that "the Secretary-General shall monitor accomplishments, as measured by the delivery of outputs". In these circumstances, defining and measuring outcomes remains a challenge. Moreover, in an organization such as the Secretariat where some of its functions are normative, it can be very difficult to measure the direct results of an intervention.

Embedding and institutionalizing results-based management

32. Embedding results-based management in the Secretariat and fully institutionalizing this management approach, where results are used for decision-making, learning, improving performance and accountability at all levels, is a challenging task that will take time.

Building a culture of results

33. Developing and sustaining a results culture is another major challenge. Among the key success factors is the importance of leadership and establishing a culture of change through training and incentives[7] as well as through periodic review of the results-based management systems.[4]

Evaluation

34. Evaluation is an essential component of the results-based management cycle, but the level of resources in the Secretariat dedicated to the self-evaluation function is insufficient for the task (see A/68/70).

Moving forward with results-based management in the absence of dedicated resources and in the context of competing priorities

35. In the current financial situation of the Organization — and while it is simultaneously implementing other transformative management reform initiatives, such as Umoja and IPSAS — moving forward with results-based management represents an enormous challenge that the Secretariat is continuing to undertake in a phased approach.

[6] John Mayne, "Challenges and lessons in implementing results-based management, evaluation", *Evaluation*, vol. 13, No. 1, pp. 87-109.

[7] Miguel Jimenez Pont, "Results-based management: delivering aid for trade with the beneficiaries in mind", *International Trade Forum*, No. 4 (October-December 2011).

D. Views of relevant bodies, including the Committee for Programme and Coordination

36. Given the timing of the presentation of the second progress report of the Secretary-General (A/67/714), which included the conceptual framework for results-based management, and of the present report, consultations have not been held with the Committee for Programme and Coordination as the General Assembly had requested.

37. Informal discussion might be held on the subject matter in the context of the fifty-fourth session of the Committee, in June 2014.

IV. Enterprise risk management and internal control framework

Secretariat-wide risk assessment

38. By its resolution 67/253, the General Assembly welcomed the progress made towards the implementation of enterprise risk management and the plans of the Secretary-General to implement a Secretariat-wide risk assessment and requested him to include the results in the next progress report on accountability.

39. Since that time, the enterprise risk management function, located in the Office of the Under-Secretary-General for Management, has continued to provide assistance and advice to different areas of the Organization working towards full implementation of enterprise risk management as part of their operations, such as the Capacity Development Office of the Department of Economic and Social Affairs of the Secretariat and UNEP.

40. In addition, the enterprise risk management function has focused on the implementation of the first Secretariat-wide risk assessment, which will highlight the top strategic risks of the Organization and related managerial responses.

41. The first stage of the Secretariat-wide enterprise risk assessment was the identification of preliminary risk areas, which was done by considering the strategic objectives of the Organization according to the strategic framework, a review of relevant documentation, the analysis of previous risk assessments and the consideration of cross-cutting issues emerging from oversight bodies' recommendations.

42. Meetings and a detailed in-person training programme were held with the focal points from every office and department to familiarize them with the basic concepts of enterprise risk management and the mandates provided by the General Assembly and the Management Committee, and to plan the fieldwork.

43. Interviews and workshops with virtually all the heads of departments and offices and their senior management teams across the Organization were held to prioritize the risk areas initially identified, complete the risk universe with emerging risks and define potential risk response strategies. The preliminary results of the assessment will be presented to the Management Committee in the first quarter of 2014. The preliminary risk register determined thereby will include risk definitions, a full analysis of key risk drivers, a description of the controls already established by management and an evaluation of their effectiveness, and an outline of potential risk response strategies.

44. After the Management Committee has arrived at a common understanding of the risks and their criticality, the responsible managers in the different areas of the Organization will define comprehensive risk treatment and response plans. These plans will identify the detailed risk treatment actions that management plans to introduce to further mitigate risks, the responsible officers (risk owners) and implementation timelines.

45. The enterprise risk management function will monitor progress and periodically report to the Management Committee on the implementation, updating and maintaining of the risk register as appropriate. In this manner, a strategic enterprise risk management and control process will become instrumental in the progressive promotion of a risk-driven culture across the entire Organization.

46. The fieldwork of the exercise inspired several offices (e.g., United Nations Office at Vienna/United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime and UN-Habitat) to commit to the immediate full implementation of enterprise risk management within the scope of their own activities. Following the completion of the Secretariat-wide risk assessment, the enterprise risk management function will continue to support the momentum towards implementation across the Organization, even within the extremely limited resources currently available to the programme.

47. In support of the adoption of an effective framework, the enterprise risk management function will also continue to work on the implementation of a comprehensive communications programme, including (a) an e-learning course now available to all staff in Inspira, (b) in-person training sessions and workshops, (c) enterprise risk management and internal control web pages on iSeek and (d) the community of practice on Unite Connections, which includes some 130 practitioners representing different entities of the United Nations system and other international institutions.

Action plan

48. The action plan can be summarized as follows:

- Completion of the Secretariat-wide enterprise risk assessment

  Responsible entity: Office of the Under-Secretary-General, Department of Management

  Implementation date: March 2014

- Validation of its conclusions by the Management Committee

  Responsible entity: Management Committee (upon completion by the Office of the Under-Secretary-General)

  Implementation date: April 2014

- Identification of risk owners and definition of comprehensive risk treatment and response plans

  Responsible entity: Management Committee/risk owners

  Implementation date: first phase by June 2014, then ongoing

- Monitoring and reporting to the Management Committee and to the Independent Audit Advisory Committee on the implementation of risk treatment and response plans and the overall risk profile of the Organization

  Responsible entity: Office of the Under-Secretary-General, Department of Management

  Implementation date: Ongoing

- Communication programme for enterprise risk management: (a) disseminating the e-learning course in Inspira; (b) planning further in-person training sessions and workshops; (c) continuing to develop the enterprise risk management and internal control web pages on iSeek; and (d) the enterprise risk management community of practice

  Responsible entity: Office of the Under-Secretary-General, Department of Management

  Implementation date: Ongoing

V. Personal accountability

Senior managers' compacts

49. The Management Performance Board streamlined the 2014 compact template and made it more strategic by focusing on the top five programmatic priorities of each senior manager and the transformational management reform projects (Umoja and IPSAS). The Board also limited the categories of standard managerial indicators to those related to human and financial resources management and the implementation of oversight body recommendations, which are the core of senior-level management responsibilities.

50. The purpose of these changes is to further shift the focus of the compact away from compliance to a more strategic, results-oriented approach. In addition, with fewer indicators, the Board hopes that senior managers will be better able to monitor their progress throughout the year and take corrective action as necessary. To support these efforts, the Board itself intends to conduct a mid-year review of senior managers' progress towards meeting the targets in their compacts.

51. Although the Board reduced the overall number of standard indicators in the compacts for 2014, it decided to add one new human resources management indicator related to the Performance Management and Development System, which is at the heart of results-based management and accountability. The Secretariat's compliance with and use of this system are inadequate, which hampers its ability to provide constructive feedback to staff members for developmental purposes and to hold them accountable for less than satisfactory performance.

52. Senior managers' performance on the standard managerial indicators in the compacts continues to be mixed. For example, satisfactory performance on the indicator related to recruiting female staff in all categories improved from 76 per cent in 2011 to 87 per cent in 2012 but declined from 38 per cent in 2011 to 27 per cent in 2012 on the indicator related to recruiting female staff at the P-5/D-1/D-2 categories. Similarly, the level of satisfactory performance related to the submission of information and communications technology budgets improved from 75 per cent

in 2011 to 100 per cent in 2012, whereas satisfactory performance related to the submission of information and communications technology project proposals declined from 100 per cent in 2011 to 73 per cent in 2012. Senior managers almost uniformly performed poorly on the indicator related to complying with the recruitment timelines.

53. The Office of Human Resources Management recently conducted an assessment of the functioning of the human resources management scorecard and found that while 68 per cent of users agreed that the scorecard enabled effective monitoring of delegated authority and 64 per cent believed that the scorecard helped their entity to achieve its human resources goals, some users complained about slow connectivity, field data not being up to date and a lack of consequences for poor performance. To address this situation, the Office is developing automatically generated quarterly "snapshot" reports in order to bring scorecard performance issues to managers' attention. For its part, the Field Personnel Division of the Department of Field Support has committed itself to completing the cleansing of its human resources data no later than 30 days after the end of each month in order to provide more timely data to its scorecard users in the field.

54. The Management Performance Board is encouraging heads of departments/missions to integrate the review of human resources performance indicators into their regular management discussions with senior staff. The Board also intends to share performance results among similar entity types to encourage the sharing of best practices and lessons learned. In addition, the Board asked the Office of Human Resources Management to provide a comprehensive briefing at its meeting in January 2014 regarding the root problems with recruitment in general and of senior female staff in particular.

55. In paragraph 9 of its resolution 67/253 on progress towards an accountability system in the Secretariat, the General Assembly requested the Secretary-General to consider placing the compacts in the public domain. The compacts are management tools employed by the Secretary-General in his role as chief administrative officer of the Organization to assign responsibilities to his senior managers and hold them personally accountable.

56. The compacts must first and foremost serve their primary purpose, that of establishing clear lines of responsibility and accountability for senior managers with regard to the Secretary-General's overall management strategy for the implementation of Member State mandates. Bearing in mind this primary objective, the "exposure" of this management tool must indeed balance the competing demands for transparency on the one hand, and the complex managerial dimensions on the other. To support this end objective, a certain degree of organizational management expertise and familiarity with the internal workings of the Organization is required. As such, after careful analysis, the Management Performance Board recommended, and the Secretary-General agreed, to maintain the current practice of publishing the compacts and performance assessments on iSeek but not on the external website.

Action plan

57. The action plan for the compacts specifies that the Management Performance Board is to conduct a mid-year review of senior managers' performance against the targets in their compacts. The responsible entities are the Board and offices that

monitor/provide data regarding the managerial indicators in the compacts. The implementation date is July 2014.

Performance management and development

58. To support the implementation of the Performance Management and Development System, promulgated in April 2010 (ST/AI/2010/5), the Secretary-General continued the rollout of the mandatory Performance Management and Development Learning Programme for all managers and supervisors. This learning programme reinforces best practices in performance management and development and emphasizes the linkage between individual workplans and mandates of the Organization, as well as the need to effectively address underperformance. In order to ensure maximum accessibility and continuous learning, such programmes are increasingly being delivered through a blended learning approach. Additionally, an e-learning programme for staff at large on the importance of accountability for individual performance is under development.

59. Current reforms to the performance management system focus primarily on strengthening the role of senior management, dealing effectively with underperformance, and activities around recognizing and awarding high performance. A critical step towards senior management accountability is the inclusion by the Secretary-General of a performance management-related indicator in the compacts for 2014. The Secretary-General is also ensuring that all incoming Assistant and Under-Secretaries-General are briefed on the importance of accountability for effective performance management in their departments/offices/missions and of complying with established timelines.

60. In terms of recognizing and rewarding strong performance, a draft awards and recognition paper has been developed by the Staff Management Committee Working Group on Performance Management and Development. It is based on the experience of a broad range of successful organizations and is primarily intended to foster a culture of appreciation.

Action plan

61. The action plan can be summarized as follows:

- Revision of the policy and ePerformance tool to simplify and clarify processes

  Responsible entity: Office of Human Resources Management

  Implementation date: Ongoing throughout 2014 and 2015

- Development of e-learning programmes for managers and staff at large on performance management to increase accessibility of such learning programmes

  Responsible entity: Office of Human Resources Management

  Implementation date: Ongoing throughout 2014 and 2015

- Improved reporting capabilities (human resources management scorecard) to ensure greater compliance monitoring

  Responsible entity: Office of Human Resources Management

  Implementation date: Ongoing

- Promulgation of guidance related to awards and recognition

  Responsible entity: Office of Human Resources Management

  Implementation date: 2015

- Issuance of detailed guidance on evaluating staff and handling underperformance

  Responsible entity: Office of Human Resources Management

  Implementation date: First quarter 2014

Actions of the Management Evaluation Unit for management and accountability purposes

62. The Secretariat's internal justice system is comprised of three components on the formal side: the management evaluation process, the United Nations Dispute Tribunal and the United Nations Appeals Tribunal. The present section of the report focuses on management evaluation, which is the mandatory first step for staff members who wish to contest an administrative decision and provides an opportunity for managers to reverse or otherwise correct improper decisions.

63. As table 1 shows, the percentage of contested administrative decisions that were upheld by management evaluation reviews increased from 84 per cent in 2010 to 97 per cent in 2011 and remained high at 95 per cent in 2012. This excludes settlements. As at 30 June 2013, in 87 per cent of cases considered by the Dispute Tribunal upon staff member applications following management evaluations filed in 2012, the Tribunal confirmed on different grounds, or partly confirmed, the recommendations of the Management Evaluation Unit in the Office of the Under-Secretary-General for Management.

Table 1
Outcome of management evaluation requests as at 31 December 2012 (excluding settlements)

	Management evaluation requests (percentage of total in parentheses)			
	2010	*2011*	*2012*	*Total*[a]
Decision upheld	107 (84)	499 (97)	239 (95)	894 (92)
Partially upheld	2 (1.5)	2 (0)	2 (1)	23 (2)
Reversed	16 (3)	11 (2)	10 (4)	46 (5)
Other[b]	2 (1.5)	3 (1)	0 (0)	8 (1)
Total	**127 (100)**	**515 (100)**	**251 (100)**	**971 (100)**

[a] Figures have been rounded and include data for the period 1 July 2009 to 31 December 2009 (49 upheld, 17 partially upheld, 9 reversed and 3 other).

[b] Includes requests for which a management evaluation was deemed redundant on account of the staff member's concurrent application with the Disputes Tribunal.

Accountability of managers

64. In all cases where decisions are reversed or settled, the Management Evaluation Unit explains to the decision maker the legal analysis for the

recommendation. In 2012, in connection with two management evaluation requests that resulted in settlement, the settlement proposal and accountability review were brought to the attention of the decision makers and their supervisors in writing and their signature was requested acknowledging their review of the matter. The fact that a managerial decision is being reversed is itself an accountability measure, which is noted by the manager and the head of his/her office and serves as a lesson learned.

65. In cases where the Management Evaluation Unit considers that the contested issue may be of systemic concern, the Unit recommends that the department in question engage in further review of the issue or remind its staff members of the need to follow the guidelines in question.

66. Drawing on the trends and lessons learned from the review of contested administrative decisions by the Management Evaluation Unit as well as the judgments of the Dispute and Appeals Tribunals, the Under-Secretary-General for Management issues "lessons learned guides" to managers.

67. In addition, the Management Performance Board annually reviews the outcome of the internal justice proceedings for management and accountability purposes. The Board's most recent review identified two emerging trends: the need for more effective and timely performance management and the importance of addressing delays in making decisions that affect staff. The Chef de Cabinet, as chair of the Board, wrote to senior managers alerting them to these findings, stressing the need for strong leadership by example and reminding them of training and other resources available for guidance on managing staff.

VI. Strengthening accountability in the field missions

68. As relates to managerial and personal accountability in field missions, the Organization has proceeded with the implementation of the integrated conduct and discipline framework (see A/66/679, paras. 126 and 127). A particular focus was placed on the implementation of initiatives under the strengthened programme of action for sexual exploitation and abuse (see A/67/766, sect. IV).

69. Under one such initiative, the Under-Secretaries-General for Peacekeeping Operations, Political Affairs and Field Support jointly issued guidance to uniformed and non-uniformed personnel serving in field missions and highlighted areas of organizational and personal accountability. The Secretariat also appointed a team of independent experts to conduct assessment visits in the four missions having the highest levels of alleged instances of sexual exploitation and abuse in order to analyse the factors contributing to this situation and to look for a comprehensive solution. Findings and recommendations from the reports of the experts are currently being reviewed and will be the object of further consultations. Agreed recommendations will be included in risk management activities.

70. Consultations are taking place to finalize a policy on accountability for conduct and discipline in field missions and the associated accountability framework and scorecard mechanism, the implementation of which will serve to evaluate the efforts of managers and commanders in the prevention of, and response to, alleged misconduct, including acts of sexual exploitation and abuse.

71. The Secretariat sent guidance to field missions on the implementation of General Assembly resolution 66/93 on criminal accountability. This guidance stressed the requirement to report immediately to Headquarters any allegations that may involve criminal conduct and the obligation to cooperate with the host State in carrying out all necessary investigations, when alleged misconduct by United Nations officials and experts on mission may amount to a crime.

72. Other measures to strengthen accountability include the continuous requirement that heads of mission employ risk management practices in their decision making processes — including those related to the specific risks of sexual exploitation and abuse in field missions — and that chief fiduciaries provide letters of representation at the end of each financial period.

73. In addition, the Department of Field Support continued to make steady progress on the implementation of enterprise risk management in field missions, including the nearly completed strategic risk assessment for the global field support strategy. Risk management focal points have been identified in peacekeeping operations and are being identified in special political missions, and a community of practice has been established.

74. Finally, to ensure robust compliance by field missions with the Financial Regulations and Rules of the United Nations (ST/SGB/2013/4), the Department of Field Support also oversees and supports the exercise of delegations of procurement authority to the field.

Action plan

75. The action plan can be summarized as follows:

- Finalization of a policy on accountability for conduct and discipline in field missions and of the associated accountability framework and scorecard mechanism

  Responsible entity: Department of Field Support

  Implementation date: 2014

- Review of letters of representation

  Responsible entity: Department of Field Support

  Implementation date: Fourth quarter of 2014

- Introduction of risk management practices into "pilot" areas

  Responsible entity: Department of Field Support

  Implementation date: global field support strategy, first quarter of 2014; Criminal Law and Judicial Advisory Service and Conduct and Discipline Service, second quarter of 2014

VII. Ethics and accountability

Ethical risks faced by the United Nations

76. The United Nations faces three types of ethics and reputational risks: individual integrity, process integrity and institutional integrity risks. The work of

the Ethics Office to date has focused primarily on individual integrity risks. The Office's administration of the financial disclosure programme, the voluntary public disclosure initiative, the protection against retaliation policy, outreach and education are all examples of the work undertaken to identify and mitigate individual integrity risks. The Office has provided advisory and policy consultation in connection with several process integrity risks, such as reporting and "speak up" systems, internal investigations mechanisms and confidentiality modalities.

77. In addition, the Office is increasingly asked to consult on the institution-wide integrity risks that can arise in connection with major initiatives, such as the human rights agenda, impunity, independence and third party due diligence in procurement. The most recent report of the Secretary-General on the activities of the Ethics Office (A/68/348) details the activities and results of the Office.

Ongoing efforts and recent initiatives for strengthening ethics in the Organization

78. The commitment of the Ethics Office to expanded outreach, raising awareness and ethics education has resulted in a significantly increased use of its services by staff. Each year, approximately 2 per cent of the total workforce requests Ethics Office services. The website of the Office (www.un.org/en/ethics), available in the six official languages of the United Nations, provides the same information to staff and the general public. In its first full year of operations, the website received over 60,000 site visitors.

79. The Office is also engaged in initiatives that focus on process and institutional integrity risks, including ethical leadership behaviour and metrics/evaluation services. For instance, the Office has played a consultative role in mitigating ethical and reputational risks that arise from multi-stakeholder partnership initiatives, as well as reliance upon extrabudgetary sources for financial support.

80. The Office has initiated an independent review of the existing policy on protection against retaliation, which focuses on enhancing how the Organization encourages the reporting of serious misconduct, protects whistle-blowers from retaliation and intervenes to prevent retaliation from occurring.

81. With several other departments, the Ethics Office is actively engaged in consultations on ways to enhance the reporting of observed misconduct by staff, through a proposed centralized intake system and a streamlined internal investigations process.

82. In 2012-2013, the Ethics Office launched leadership dialogues to ensure that all staff members participate in annual ethics conversations. The Office developed a self-executing discussion guide on what it means to be an international civil servant, focusing on the United Nations oath of office. By 31 August 2013, more than 40 per cent of all staff (international and national staff combined) had successfully completed their dialogue sessions.

83. The Director of the Ethics Office has conducted confidential ethics induction briefings with incoming and newly appointed Assistant Secretaries-General and Under-Secretaries-General, reaching the majority of executives within 12 months of their appointment.

84. The Director of the Ethics Office also conducted confidential ethical leadership behaviour assessments for Under-Secretaries-General who sign senior

manager's compacts. Between 2011 and 2013, the Director has provided feedback on specific behavioural strengths and weaknesses to 26 senior executives, incorporating upwards feedback from over 1,500 staff members. Results from these assessments will be incorporated into an emerging model for ethical leadership behaviour for senior managers.

85. In 2012, the Office undertook a formal ethics and reputational risk assessment of United Nations field missions in response to requests from the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions and the Under-Secretary-General for Field Support. This assessment identified the likelihood of risk occurrence and the potential seriousness of such risks impacting the ability of the United Nations to fulfil its peacekeeping mandate.

Action plan

86. The action plan can be summarized as follows:

- Launch a redesigned online introductory ethics training programme, with the support and assistance of the Department of Management

  Responsible entity: Ethics Office (with support from the Department of Management)

  Implementation date: 2014

- Complete a comprehensive review of the regulatory framework for the Secretary-General's bulletin on protection against retaliation for reporting misconduct and for cooperating with duly authorized audits or investigations (ST/SGB/2005/21)

  Responsible entity: Ethics Office (with the input and support of the Department of Management, the Office of Legal Affairs and the Office of Internal Oversight Services)

  Implementation date: 2014

- Complete a comprehensive review of the regulatory framework for the Secretary-General's bulletin on financial disclosure and declaration of interest statements (ST/SGB/2006/6), and propose amendments

  Responsible entity: Ethics Office (with the input and support of the Office of Programme Planning, Budget and Accounts and the Office of Legal Affairs)

  Implementation date: 2014

- Propose a model of ethical leadership for senior managers based on the aggregated data obtained from the 2011 and 2013 cycles for the ethical leadership behaviour assessment

  Responsible entity: Ethics Office (with the input and support of the Department of Management and the Executive Office of the Secretary-General)

  Implementation date: fourth quarter of 2014

VIII. Root causes of systemic issues in the reports of the United Nations Board of Auditors

87. In its resolution 67/253, the General Assembly endorsed the recommendation of the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions (see A/67/776, para. 22) that additional efforts be undertaken to address the root causes of the recurring issues identified by the Board of Auditors. The Department of Management, in coordination with the Department of Field Support, undertook an analysis of the latest reports of the Board, the results of which are reported in the annexes to the present report.

IX. Strengthening accountability in procurement

88. Following are the most recent initiatives taken by the Secretariat to strengthen accountability in the procurement process.

Delegation of authority

89. In April 2013, the Procurement Division of the Office of Central Support Services, Department of Management, produced a revised matrix on delegation of procurement authority for United Nations Headquarters and issued a completely new matrix of delegation of procurement authority for mission staff, clearly outlining the approving and signatory authority for each procurement activity at every level.

United Nations Supplier Code of Conduct

90. The Supplier Code of Conduct was revised in 2013 and endorsed by the members of the High-level Committee on Management Procurement Network, broadening its scope to all entities of the United Nations system. It is now mandatory for any vendor to accept the Supplier Code of Conduct as part of the vendor registration process in the United Nations Global Marketplace.

Procurement training

91. The Procurement Division continues to provide online procurement training courses that are available to all United Nations staff and are mandatory for procurement staff at Headquarters. At the end of October 2013, a total of 3,880 certificates had been issued for completion of the various procurement training courses, including 988 certificates for the "Ethics and integrity in procurement" training. Prior to the introduction of the online version of the training, over 1,200 staff members had received this training "face-to-face".

Key performance indicators related to accountability in the procurement area

92. The Procurement Division has developed several key performance indicators to monitor sole source awards and ex post facto cases and to assess performance and adherence to envisaged timelines. These will be fully deployed and available at end of 2014 and include:

- Purchase order/contract creation cycle time: average number of business days from bid creation to purchase order/contract issuance

- Purchase order release cycle time: average number of business days from requisition receipt to purchase order issuance (not against established contract)
- Purchase order release cycle time: average number of business days from requisition receipt to purchase order issuance (against established contract)
- Sole vendor sourcing cases: percentage of sole vendor sourcing cases
- Vendor diversity: percentage of invited vendors from developing countries, countries in transition and least developed countries
- Case preparation for submission to the Headquarters Committee on Contracts: average number of business days from Headquarters Committee on Contracts case creation to submission
- Cases returned by the Headquarters Committee on Contracts: percentage of cases returned at least once by the Headquarters Committee on Contracts
- Rate of ex post facto procurement cases submitted to the Headquarters Committee on Contracts: number of ex post facto procurement cases submitted to the Headquarters Committee on Contracts

93. In addition to these, the Procurement Division intends to implement a number of additional key performance indicators subsequent to the full implementation of Umoja, including necessary business intelligence capabilities, to further increase accountability and enhance internal control.

X. Accountability for mismanagement and improper decisions

Holding staff accountable for misconduct

94. The revised disciplinary measures and procedures (ST/AI/371 and Amend.1) and the Secretary-General's bulletin on the prohibition of discrimination, harassment, including sexual harassment, and abuse of authority (ST/SGB/2008/5) are, together with the Staff Regulations and Rules, the two main instruments that describe the types of conduct for which disciplinary measures may be imposed. Both administrative issuances are in the process of being revised; the revisions are expected to be completed during 2014.

95. During the most recent year reported, covering the period from 1 July 2012 to 30 June 2013, a total of 43 disciplinary measures were imposed. The categories of fraud/misrepresentation and theft/misappropriation represented the largest number of cases with, respectively, 12 (28 per cent) and 11 (26 per cent) cases. Of the 12 cases involving fraud/misrepresentation, one staff member was dismissed (8 per cent), nine staff members were separated (75 per cent) and two staff members had other disciplinary sanctions imposed (17 per cent). Of the 11 cases involving theft/misappropriation, three staff members were dismissed (27 per cent), seven staff members were separated (64 per cent) and one staff member had another disciplinary sanction imposed (9 per cent). With regard to the other categories of misconduct, during the period from 1 July 2012 to 30 June 2013, there was one case of sexual exploitation and abuse (2 per cent), in respect of which the staff member was dismissed (100 per cent), one case of assault (2 per cent), where one staff member was separated (100 per cent), five cases of harassment (12 per cent), in which all five staff members had other disciplinary sanctions imposed (100 per

cent), two cases of misuse of United Nations assets (5 per cent), in which one staff member was dismissed (50 per cent) and one staff member had another disciplinary sanction imposed (50 per cent), one case of misuse of information and communications technology resources (2 per cent), in which one staff member had another disciplinary sanction imposed (100 per cent), two cases of gross negligence (in the context of a theft) (5 per cent), in which one staff member was dismissed (50 per cent) and one staff member was separated (50 per cent), two cases of inappropriate or disruptive behaviour (5 per cent), in which one staff member was dismissed (50 per cent) and one staff member was separated (50 per cent), two cases of procurement irregularities (5 per cent), in which two staff members had other disciplinary sanctions imposed (100 per cent), and four other cases (9 per cent), in which all four staff members had other disciplinary sanctions imposed (100 per cent).

XI. Recommendations to the General Assembly

96. **The General Assembly is requested to take note of the progress of the Secretariat in strengthening its accountability system, as described in the present report.**

Annex I

Actions taken to address the root causes of the recurring issues identified by the Board of Auditors in its reports on United Nations peacekeeping operations

Recurrent issues	*Root causes*	*Management actions taken to address the root causes*
Financial overview and management		
Large number of unliquidated obligations created at end of year	The raising of obligations at the end of the year often corresponds to the period of time needed to complete the procurement process in the case of complex peacekeeping operations. In addition, costs for a number of significant items, including troop-contributing country reimbursements, are intentionally deferred until the end of the year to ensure that final obligations for the budget period are accurate	The Administration endeavours to ensure that expenditure is always brought to account as obligations at the time a commitment is made. The reduction in the cancellation of prior-period unliquidated obligations noted by the Board of Auditors in paragraph 14 of its report on United Nations peacekeeping operations (A/67/5 (Vol. II)) is due to the constant reminders sent to the missions and a robust review of unliquidated obligations in the missions and at United Nations Headquarters. The Administration will continue to work with the missions to ensure that only valid obligations are retained in the accounts. It is also expected that the introduction of the International Public Sector Accounting Standards (IPSAS) will help to address this issue
Asset management		
Discrepancies in non-expendable property	In many instances, hostile security conditions on the ground impede access to sites where assets are located	The property management performance results in the area of records accuracy and reconciliation of discrepancies for non-expendable property have improved during the period prior to IPSAS opening balances: • The achievement in the active peacekeeping missions on the review and reconciliation of discrepancies related to record accuracy at the end of the 2012/13 financial year reached 98 per cent, as compared to 62 per cent at the end of the 2008/09 financial year,

Recurrent issues	*Root causes*	*Management actions taken to address the root causes*
		72 per cent at the end of the 2009/10 financial year, 83 per cent at the end of the 2010/11 financial year, and 91 per cent at the end of the 2011/12 financial year • Similarly, the number of items marked with an outstanding "not found yet" discrepancy declined by 43 per cent, from 4,194 items at the end of the 2011/12 financial year to 2,376 at the end of the 2012/13 financial year
Non-expendable items at missions held in stock for more than one year	Headquarters and missions did not take full account of assets already in stock when making the requisitions	The Department of Field Support has circulated an instruction to all active missions to consider their stock levels, system contracts, strategic deployment stocks, surpluses declared by other missions and procurement lead times during the acquisition planning process. Furthermore, the Department had established an internal control mechanism whereby it reviews and authorizes all goods procured by missions exceeding $1 million in value, even after approval of the mission's acquisition plan. In March 2013, the Department handed over the acquisition planning process for missions to the Global Service Centre. To further strengthen acquisition planning and to ensure that all elements of the process are coordinated, tracked and shared with the various components at Headquarters, the Office of the Assistant Secretary-General for Field Support became the main entry point for all mission acquisition plans in May 2013 In addition to the above measures to strengthen acquisition planning, the Department has established a mechanism for periodic review of monitoring of asset utilization in the field missions, in connection with which the missions have been

Recurrent issues	*Root causes*	*Management actions taken to address the root causes*
		requested to utilize the corporate business intelligence tools and key performance indicators, such as "ageing stock", "good surplus" and "equipment utilization timeframe", in order to assess equipment utilization rates and establish an optimal commodity distribution strategy. Furthermore, the Department developed a global asset management capability, following the transfer of asset management functions to the Global Service Centre
Delays in the write-off and disposal of assets at missions	Often, the process of disposal was hampered by lack of cooperation and restrictions imposed by the local authorities, poor and unfavourable local market conditions and lack of qualified vendors	The Department of Field Support directive and workplan on property management for the financial year 2013 established write-off and disposal as a priority for the field missions The revised delegation of authority for property management was fully implemented, resulting in a streamlined write-off process in which the Local Property Survey Board review was eliminated for routine low-risk disposal cases. The measures taken by the Department during the reporting period have delivered results, as evidenced by improved performance in the following areas: • The timeline of the write-off process over the last two financial years has substantially improved (from 149 days to 99 days) and is now within the tolerance rate (90 days target with 30 days tolerance) • The timeline of disposal by commercial sale process has improved in comparison with the previous financial year for both the completed and the pending cases. The timeline of pending commercial sales (106 days) is now within the target of 180 days

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Recurrent issues	*Root causes*	*Management actions taken to address the root causes*
Procurement and contract management		
The total value of ex post facto cases increased from $179.9 million in 2008/09 to $233.7 million in 2011/12[a]	In general, root causes for ex post facto cases include exigency situations, poor management of some contracts, inadequate planning and slow processing of local committee on contracts cases	The Department of Field Support promulgated a new contract management policy effective April 2012, and the chief contract management position at the Global Service Centre was filled to assist the missions in the implementation of the new policy and contract management issues. The Department is now tracking field procurement cases that require action by Headquarters to minimize delays and reduce incidences of ex post facto cases. In addition, the Department now requires all missions to provide a statement with their ex post facto cases detailing measures that have been put into place to avoid a reoccurrence
Vehicle fleet management		
The light passenger vehicle holdings in missions exceeded the required ratio	Vehicle entitlements at missions were not routinely reviewed to identify the scope for savings Factors such as mission drawdowns, changes in mission mandates and staffing review exercises resulted in a reduction of staff, causing light passenger vehicle holdings to exceed the suggested ratios	The Department of Field Support implemented a robust and regular system of reviewing mission light passenger vehicle holdings against standard vehicle ratios applied to the various categories of mission personnel. The Department manages surpluses and deficiencies from a global perspective and promotes action to bring missions into line with or below their calculated light passenger vehicle ceilings. Analysis and reviews conducted during the 2011/12 and 2012/13 financial years identified surplus vehicles, which were ultimately used to offset requirements in other missions. Associated inter-mission transfers and stringent review of acquisitions have directly contributed to organizational savings

[a] The Administration wishes to clarify that, while there may have been an increase in the total value of ex post facto cases, there was an overall decrease in the number of cases from 100 cases in 2010 to fewer than 40 in 2012.

Annex II

Actions taken to address the root causes of the recurring issues identified by the Board of Auditors in its reports on United Nations non-peacekeeping areas

Recurrent issues	*Root causes*	*Management actions taken to address the root causes*
Trust fund and project management		
Delays in closure of unnecessary trust funds	Delays by some donors in providing responses and agreement on how the trust fund balances should be disposed of Donors often do not want a return of unspent balances and some trust fund balances are not material Despite being recently inactive, some of the trust funds are expected to become active later on	The closure of unnecessary trust funds is under regular review by the Office of Programme Planning, Budget and Accounts and there is follow-up with the relevant offices
Programme planning and performance reporting		
Inadequate logical frameworks and results-based management system	Lack of adequate training of staff in the areas of logical frameworks and results-based management The nature of the work of the Secretariat, which comprises normative, substantive and support functions, makes the formulation of logical frameworks difficult since the work is not easy to quantify or measure	The Secretariat has made progress in these areas through the continuous efforts of programme managers with the support of the Department of Management A working group on results-based management convened by the Under-Secretary-General for Management has made recommendations related to training, advocacy and outreach and the development of toolkits, to be implemented in a phased approach, to improve the implementation of results-based management (see sect. III of the present report). In addition, the Office of Programme Planning, Budget and Accounts will continue its collaboration with programme managers on the preparation of the programme and planning documents of the Organization to improve the quality of the logical frameworks

Recurrent issues	Root causes	Management actions taken to address the root causes
Asset management		
Inadequate controls over asset management, including incomplete recording of new assets; inadequate physical verifications and inventory counts; and incomplete reconciliation between physical inventories and accounting data	Under the United Nations System Accounting Standards (UNSAS), assets are expensed in the financial period in which they are purchased, making close monitoring difficult. In addition, the Organization currently has no enterprise system that supports an end-to-end (sourcing to disposal) process of assets management	With the ongoing introduction of the International Public Sector Accounting Standards (IPSAS), which require full accrual accounting, the Secretariat is making a major effort to increase controls over asset management. The Office of Programme Planning, Budget and Accounts and the Office of Central Support Services are collaborating on guidelines on asset management, which are being issued to all departments/offices, and the conversion to Umoja will introduce tightened processes and systems to better support asset management and reporting A permanent central property management capacity at United Nations Headquarters, as well as dedicated resources locally, will be needed to improve controls over property management with the adoption of IPSAS
Central Emergency Response Fund of the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs		
Insufficient control over activities and expenditures by implementing partners of the Office	Under UNSAS, funds provided by the Office to its implementing partners are expensed in the financial period in which they are disbursed, leading to weak monitoring of actual project expenditures. Further, there is currently no integrated system that supports the area of grants management and financial reporting	A change in the accounting policy will be implemented under IPSAS, which calls for a clear distinction between amounts advanced to Implementing Partners, which are recorded as advances, and amounts granted to end beneficiaries, which are immediately expensed, and a provision for advances deemed irrecoverable, which necessitates closer follow-up with implementing partners. The Office of Programme Planning, Budget and Accounts is currently developing and documenting guidance that will operationalize the policy in time for the first IPSAS financial statements. The Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs is working closely with the Office of Programme Planning, Budget and Accounts and

Recurrent issues	*Root causes*	*Management actions taken to address the root causes*
		will implement the new accounting policy in 2014. Further, the grants management solution in Umoja will bring integration and more efficient controls in this area
Procurement and contract management		
Lack of key performance indicators that are specific, measurable and relevant in procurement contracts	Lack of good automated systems for tracking the key performance indicators	The Procurement Division initiated the implementation of eight key performance indicators. The Division will analyse procurement data that can be captured in Umoja and review the feasibility of implementing another 12 key performance indicators upon deployment of Umoja, with adjustments, as necessary, to take account of the availability of data in Umoja and other existing systems. Also, the implementation of Umoja in the field missions will facilitate the provision of more conclusive data
Information and communications technology security		
Inadequate controls over information security	Insufficient priority was given to the area of information security in the previous information and communications technology strategies	The Secretariat is implementing an action plan to strengthen information security. This plan includes the following measures: *Prevention* • Initiative 1: Workstation configuration: limit administrative privileges • Initiative 2: E-mail: improved filtering for malicious code • Initiative 3: Mandatory information security awareness training for all staff (Action: Office of Information and Communications Technology/ Office of Human Resources Management) • Initiative 4: Network security: segmentation of network zones

Recurrent issues	*Root causes*	*Management actions taken to address the root causes*
		Detection and response • Initiative 5: Deployment of an intrusion detection system • Initiative 6: Subscription to a cyberintelligence service/feed (Action: Office of Information and Communications Technology) *Governance, risk and compliance* • Initiative 7: Approve and promulgate pending draft policies • Initiative 8: Classify information assets • Initiative 9: Mandatory implementation of minimum requirements for public websites • Initiative 10: Mandatory reporting of information security incidents and sharing of actionable information across the Secretariat The implementation of the action plan was started in the second quarter of 2013. Information security will be addressed comprehensively in the information and communications technology strategy to be submitted to the General Assembly at its sixty-ninth session

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Agenda item 44
Question of the Falkland Islands (Malvinas)

Letter dated 3 January 2014 from the Permanent Representative of Argentina to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

On instructions from my Government, I have the honour to transmit herewith a note on the 181st anniversary of the illegitimate British occupation of the Malvinas Islands, issued by the Government of the Argentine Republic on 3 January 2014, the latest anniversary of the illegitimate occupation of the Malvinas Islands by the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland (see annex).

I should be grateful if you would have this letter and its annex circulated as a document of the General Assembly under agenda item 44, concerning the question of the Malvinas Islands.

(*Signed*) María Cristina **Perceval**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

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Annex to the letter dated 3 January 2014 from the Permanent Representative of Argentina to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

Note on the 181st anniversary of the illegitimate British occupation of the Malvinas Islands

On 3 January 1833, British military forces occupied the Malvinas Islands, expelled the population and the Argentine authorities lawfully established there and replaced them with British subjects. The Argentine Republic immediately protested against that unlawful act of force by the colonial Power, to which it never gave its consent.

The illegitimate British colonial occupation has been exacerbated by a provocative and continuous disregard for international law, manifested through the United Kingdom's steadfast refusal to resume sovereignty negotiations in accordance with the United Nations mandate in force, established by General Assembly resolution 2065 (XX) and reaffirmed by nine more Assembly resolutions and 31 Special Committee on decolonization resolutions, the most recent of which was adopted unanimously on 20 June 2013.

The Argentine Government reiterates that the principle of the self-determination of peoples, which is the sole ground invoked by the United Kingdom in support of its position on the Malvinas Islands, is totally and manifestly inappropriate and inapplicable to the sovereignty dispute over the Malvinas Islands, South Georgia Islands and South Sandwich Islands and the surrounding maritime areas. By invoking it with the aim of perpetuating a colonial situation, the British position seeks to distort this principle, thereby defeating the purposes for which it was intended. None of the criteria for applying the principle of self-determination are met by the question of the Malvinas Islands. In addition, the British position is contrary to the provisions of resolution 2065 (XX) and subsequent General Assembly resolutions, as well as the resolutions on the question of the Malvinas Islands adopted each year by the Special Committee on decolonization. What is more, in 1985, the General Assembly twice expressly ruled out the possibility of applying that principle to the question of the Malvinas Islands.

The United Kingdom's refusal to open a dialogue with Argentina on this question is compounded by the military presence it maintains on the pretext of alleged defence requirements and by the constant conduct of unlawful unilateral activities in the Malvinas Islands, South Georgia Islands and South Sandwich Islands and the surrounding maritime areas, such as the issuance of fishing licences and permits for hydrocarbons exploration and exploitation. These activities are in clear contravention of General Assembly resolution 31/49, in which the two parties are called upon to refrain from introducing unilateral modifications in the situation pending the completion of the negotiation process recommended by the Assembly.

The United Kingdom's colonial attitude contrasts with Argentina's willingness to engage in dialogue, which is increasingly supported by the international community. Indeed, the Argentine Republic's legitimate and imprescriptible sovereignty rights in the question of the Malvinas Islands are strongly supported by the countries of Latin America, the Caribbean and Africa, which have expressed such support

through regional and biregional forums such as the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC), the Union of South American Nations (UNASUR), the Southern Common Market (MERCOSUR) and the third Africa-South America Summit, held in Malabo in February 2013. At the Ibero-American and the South American and Arab Countries Summits, as well as in the Group of 77 and China, the United Kingdom has been called upon to resume negotiations with Argentina.

The region has unanimously rejected the British military presence in the South Atlantic and has expressed concern about the above-mentioned unilateral activities through a variety of pronouncements at the presidential summits of the MERCOSUR States parties and associated States, of UNASUR and of CELAC, and at the Ibero-American Summits and meetings of the States members of the zone of peace and cooperation in the South Atlantic. This stance is reflected in the commitments undertaken by the UNASUR and MERCOSUR countries to take practical steps to prevent the entrenchment of the United Kingdom's unlawful unilateral activities in the South Atlantic and, as decided recently by the Latin American Energy Organization, in the recognition of Argentina's right to take legal action under international law in respect of unauthorized hydrocarbons exploration and exploitation activities.

Today, 181 years after the usurpation, the Argentine Government reaffirms once again the imprescriptible sovereignty rights of the Argentine Republic over the Malvinas Islands, South Georgia Islands and South Sandwich Islands and the surrounding maritime areas, which are an integral part of its territory, and reiterates its constant and sincere willingness to resume the bilateral negotiation process with the United Kingdom, as called for by the international community, in order to find a peaceful and definitive solution to the sovereignty dispute, thereby putting an end to this anachronistic situation.